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DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS AND THE 
RIGHT TO OPT OUT: LESSONS FOR CANADA 
FROM THE UNITED STATES 
BY VINCE MORABITO* 
The recently introduced class action regime in the Federal Court of 
Canada which—unlike the class action regimes in Quebec, British 
Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador 
and Alberta—authorizes the certification of defendant class actions 
renders a study of defendant class actions desirable.  The aim of 
this article is to explore the most important issue concerning the 
operation of defendant class actions, namely, whether any restric-
tions should be placed upon the ability of members of a defendant 
class to exclude themselves from the class, that is, to opt out. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It seems more than probable that the court, having gone to the 
trouble and expense of learning the name and address of each po-
tential [defendant class member] and of devising a proper notice 
and having it sent out, will wind up with no “class” of defendants, 
but only those who are named as defendants and are served with 
process in the ordinary way.1 
An unnamed member who feels it cannot be adequately repre-
sented by named defendants or by counsel for unnamed defendants 
will have the opportunity to “opt out” of the suit and not be bound 
by the judgment or to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice.  
The opportunity for exclusion is adequate protection for whatever 
due process rights are not satisfied by actual notice and representa-
tion by the named defendant or by counsel for unnamed defen-
dants.2 
Most North American lawyers are familiar with class actions brought 
on behalf of a group of persons who share similar claims against the 
same defendant or defendants.  The potential benefits of plaintiff 
 
 * BEc, LLB (Hons), LLM, PhD (Monash University); Associate Professor, Department 
of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University (Victoria, Australia).   
 1. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., con-
curring). 
 2. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance–United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 140 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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class actions were recently summarized, as follows, by the Supreme 
Court of Canada: 
[C]lass actions provide three important advantages over a multiplic-
ity of individual suits.  First, by aggregating similar individual ac-
tions, class actions serve judicial economy by avoiding unnecessary 
duplication in fact–finding and legal analysis [the judicial economy 
goal].  Second, by distributing fixed litigation costs amongst a large 
number of class members, class actions improve access to justice by 
making economical the prosecution of claims that any one class 
member would find too costly to prosecute on his or her own [the 
access to justice goal].  Third, class actions serve efficiency and jus-
tice by ensuring that actual and potential wrongdoers modify their 
behaviour to take full account of the harm they are causing, or 
might cause, to the public [the behavior modification goal].3 
But similar benefits may be secured through the maintenance of de-
fendant class actions:4 
A defendant class action is a civil action brought against one or 
more persons defending on behalf of a group of persons similarly 
situated.  It provides an efficient procedural mechanism for the de-
termination of common issues in a complex proceeding involving 
multiple parties.  It offers a means of binding all interested parties 
and, therefore, prevents relitigation of the same issues in a multi-
tude of law suits.  The advantages of a defending class action in-
clude the conservation of judicial resources and private litigation 
costs, both absolutely, by preventing relitigation of the same issues, 
and relatively, by spreading expenses and resolving common issues 
 
 3. Hollick v. Toronto (City), [2001] 205 D.L.R. (4th) 19, 28–29.  See In re N. Dist. of Cal. 
“Dalkon Shield” I.U.D. Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citations 
omitted): 
In a complex society such as ours, the phenomenon of numerous persons suffering the 
same or similar injuries as a result of a single pattern of misconduct on the part of a de-
fendant is becoming increasingly frequent. 
The judicial system’s response to such repetitive litigation has often been blind adher-
ence to the common law’s traditional notion of civil litigation as necessarily private 
dispute resolution.  In situations where this traditional mode of litigation threatens to 
leave large numbers of people without a speedy and practical means of redress and si-
multaneously threatens to expose defendants to continuing punishment for the same 
wrongful acts, the class action device is a powerful tool to accomplish its proclaimed 
goals of judicial economy and fairness. 
 4. See Robert E. Holo, Comment, Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule 23 and A 
Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 223, 225 (1990) (citation omitted): 
[D]efendant class actions promote judicial efficiency and conserve judicial re-
sources. . . . The English Chancery Court recognized this principle over 300 years ago 
when it wrote, in the context of what today would be termed a defendant class action, 
‘If the Defendant should not be bound, Suits of this Nature, as in the case of Inclo-
sures, Suit against the Inhabitants for Suit to a Mill, and the like, would be infinite, and 
impossible to be ended.’ 
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over a large number of defendants.  In this sense, greater access to 
the courts, by plaintiffs and defendants alike, is achieved.5 
And yet, defendant class actions have been virtually ignored by legal 
commentators in Canada.6 This state of affairs is partly attributable to 
the fact that, until the introduction in November 2002 of a new com-
prehensive class action regime in the Federal Court of Canada, On-
tario was the only Canadian jurisdiction that had in place a detailed 
class action regime that authorized courts to certify defendant 
classes.7  The lack of scholarly interest in defendant class actions also 
stems from the fact that in the eleven years or so that the Ontario re-
gime—governed by the Class Proceedings Act (Ontario Act)—has 
been in operation, very few attempts have been made to seek certifi-
cation of defendant class actions.8 
A third reason for this lack of focus on defendant class actions in 
the Canadian legal literature is that it is generally assumed that de-
 
 5. Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Can., [1996] 29 O.R.3d 549, 558–59.  See Berry v. Pulley, 
[2001] No. 97–CV–135179, Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *16; Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment, 
Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 283 (1985); 
ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., FINAL REPORT NO. 85: CLASS ACTIONS ¶ 434 (2000), available at 
http://www.lawualberta.ca/alri/finalreports.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter ALRI 
REPORT]; R.A. Max, Defendant Class Suits as a Means of Legal and Social Reform, 13 CUMB. L. 
REV. 453, 453 (1983); Scott D. Miller, Note, Certification of Defendant Classes under Rule 
23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1984); Debra J. Gross, Mandatory Notice and Defen-
dant Class Actions: Resolving the Paradox of Identity Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 
EMORY L.J. 611, 616–20 (1991); ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS 41 
(Report no. 48 1982) [hereinafter OLRC REPORT]; RULES COMM. OF THE FED. COURT OF 
CAN., CLASS PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA: A DISCUSSION PAPER 35 
(2000) [hereinafter FC COMMITTEE]; ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS 338, 350–51  (4th ed. 2002); Note, 36 HARV. L. REV. 89, 92 (1922) [hereinafter 
1922 Note]; A. Peter Parsons & Kenneth W. Starr, Environmental Litigation and Defendant 
Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 884 (1975); Barry M. 
Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 459–60 (1977); Leighton Lee, III, Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23—Class Actions in Patent Infringement Litigation, 7 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 50, 53 (1973); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action with 
a Public Official as the Named Representative, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 361–63 (1975) [hereinafter 
VALPARAISO Note]; Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630–31, 657–58 
(1978) [hereinafter HARVARD Note]; David H. Taylor, Defendant Class Actions under Rule 
23(b)(2): Resolving the Language Dilemma, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (1991). 
 6. The author was not able to find any articles in Canadian law journals entirely or sub-
stantially devoted to a discussion of defendant class actions. 
 7. See Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 562; FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 34; ALRI REPORT, 
supra note 5, at ¶ 430. 
 8. Class Proceedings Act, SO 1992, c 6 (Ontario Act).  See Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 549; 
Woods v. Gilroy, No. 95-CU-845514, [1997] 1997 CarswellOnt 5329 (Westlaw); Lupsor Estate v. 
Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co., [2003] O.J. No. 3745, 2003 ON. C. LEXIS 2679.  See also Jay 
Prestage & Gordon McKee, Class Actions in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, in MULTI–
PARTY ACTIONS 223, 225 n.9 (Christopher Hodges ed., 2001). 
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fendant class actions raise the same issues and problems that are en-
countered with respect to plaintiff class actions and, thus, do not war-
rant separate consideration and analysis.9  This assessment of defen-
dant class actions, whilst erroneous,10 is certainly understandable 
when one peruses the provisions governing class proceedings in On-
tario, in the Federal Court of Canada and in U.S. federal courts.  In 
those jurisdictions, the regimes, procedures and prerequisites that 
were designed to cater for the needs of, and to address the potential 
problems generated by, plaintiff class actions are also applied, with no 
alteration, to regulate proceedings brought against defendant 
classes.11 
But, perhaps, the recent judgment of Justice Haines of the On-
tario Superior Court of Justice in Lupsor Estate v. Middlesex Mutual 
Insurance Co.12—together with the new regime in the Federal Court—
will generate greater interest in defendant class actions on the part of 
Canadian legal commentators.  If endorsed by Ontario’s appellate 
courts, Lupsor might also lead to a significant increase in the motions 
brought under the Ontario Act to seek certification of bilateral class 
actions, that is, litigation where plaintiff classes sue defendant classes.  
In Lupsor, it was held that a less restrictive approach to the require-
ments of the standing to sue rules is appropriate in the context of bi-
 
 9. An American court has drawn attention to “our lack of experience with defendant class 
actions.  Ordinarily, we think in terms of a single defendant who allegedly has acted unlawfully 
on grounds generally applicable to a class of plaintiffs.”  U.S. v. Trucking Employers Inc., 75 
F.R.D. 682, 692 (D.D.C. 1977).  See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 460 (“Despite the advantages of 
the defendant class suit and its availability for several centuries, few have understood or used it 
until recently.”). 
 10. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 46: GROUPED PROCEEDINGS 
IN THE FEDERAL COURT ¶ 6 (1988) [hereinafter ALRC REPORT]; OLRC REPORT, supra note 
5, at 43–44; In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Lawrence Ball, 
Note, Damages in Class Actions: Determination and Allocation, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 
615, 619 (1969); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the 
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 696–97 n.39 (1941); BT Australasia Pty Ltd. v. State of New 
South Wales, 1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 1068, at *80–81 ( Sackville, J.). 
 11. See Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 
818, 827 (1946) [hereinafter COLUM. Note]; CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 336, 339; 
Ancheta, supra note 5, at 287, 317–21; Holo, supra note 4, at 223–24; ALRI REPORT, supra note 
5, at para. 456; R.R. Simpson & C.L. Perra, Defendant Class Actions, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1319, 
1323 (2000); Rodriquez v. Township of De Kalb, No. 80 C 1509, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22302, at 
*18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1984); Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910, 920 (D.N.J. 1986); F.B. 
Kruger & J.M. Rogers, Personal Jurisdiction and Rule 23 Defendant Class Actions, 53 IND. L.J. 
841, 844 n.30 (1978); W.B. Fisch, Notice, Costs, and the Effect of Judgment in Missouri’s New 
Common––Question Class Action, 38 MO. L. REV. 173, 184 (1973); Gross, supra note 5, at 615. 
 12. [2003] O.J. No. 1038. 
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lateral class actions than what is needed for plaintiff class actions 
brought against multiple defendants who are sued individually.13 
The most significant problem that is created by the regulation of 
defendant class proceedings, through the employment of mechanisms 
devised for plaintiff class actions, concerns the conferral upon class 
members of the right to exclude themselves from the class, that is, to 
opt out.  Opt out regimes represent an important feature of every 
comprehensive class action regime that is currently in place in Canada 
and Australia.14  Pursuant to an opt out regime, a plaintiff class action 
may be initiated without first seeking the express consent of the per-
sons represented by the named plaintiff, namely, the class members.15  
Once the proceedings are certified16 as class proceedings, class mem-
 
 13. In Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp., [2002] 61 O.R.3d 433, 441, the Court of Appeal for On-
tario held that “[i]n Ontario a statement of claim must disclose a cause of action against each 
defendant.  Thus, in a proposed class action, there must be a representative plaintiff with a claim 
against each defendant.”  In Lupsor, O.J. No. 1038, at ¶ 21, it was held that representative plain-
tiffs need not have personal causes of action against each member of a putative defendant class 
in order to proceed with a motion for certification and the appointment of a representative de-
fendant.  It is interesting to note that one of the reasons relied upon by Justice Haines in Lupsor 
for not applying the Hughes principle to bilateral class actions was that: 
[A] named defendant in an intended class proceedings is a captive litigant whereas a 
member of a defendant class is not.  If certified, each [class member] that falls within 
the defined class has a choice.  It can participate in the action as a class member, not-
withstanding the absence of a representative plaintiff with a cause of action against it, 
or the [class member] can opt out and defend, as a named defendant, any subsequent 
action that may be brought by a representative plaintiff who does have the necessary 
cause of action. 
Id. at ¶ 19. 
 14. Vince Morabito, Judicial Supervision of Individual Settlements with Class Members in 
Australia, Canada and the United States, 38 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 663, 671 (2003). 
 15. In the United States, Justice Frankel described the opt out scheme as being “patterned 
after the highly successful procedures of the Book–of–the–Month Club.”  J. Marvin E. Frankel, 
Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 44 (1967).  Similarly, an 
Australian politician has drawn an analogy between the opt out model and “a book club which 
was run in such a way that, unless I sent back the monthly form to indicate a lack of interest in 
the book of the month, I received the book with a bill forthwith.”  Kevin Andrews, Austl. 
House of Rep. Parliamentary Debates 3292 (Nov. 26, 1991). 
 16. “Canadian class proceedings regimes require court approval before an action can go 
forward as a class proceeding.  This mandatory prior court approval is given in a ‘certification’ 
order.  Certification is the critical step that converts the proceeding from one between the 
parties named in the pleadings to a class proceeding.”  ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 177; 
See also 909787 Ontario Ltd. v. Bulk Barn Foods Limited, [1999] Ont Sup CJ LEXIS 1048, at 
*13 (Dunnet, J.) (“the certification motion is intended to screen claims that are not appropriate 
for class action treatment at least in part to protect the defendant from being unjustifiably 
embroiled in complex and costly litigation”).  For a summary of the perceived benefits of the 
certification model, see SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE RECOGNITION 
OF CLASS ACTIONS AND PUBLIC INTEREST ACTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW ¶ 5.5.5 (1998), 
available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/classact.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) 
[hereinafter SALC REPORT]; RUTH ROGERS, UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA, A 
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bers are offered an opportunity to opt out of the class.  Opt out re-
gimes were created with plaintiff class actions solely in mind but have 
been applied to defendant class actions with no consideration being 
given to whether the conferral of an unfettered opt out right to mem-
bers of defendant classes is appropriate.17 
In the remainder of this article it will be posited that opt out re-
gimes should not be employed in defendant class proceedings as they 
create serious obstacles to the fulfillment of the policy objectives of 
the class action device, set out above, and are not necessary to ensure 
that members of defendant classes are treated fairly.  In Part II, the 
procedures governing the ability of members of defendant classes to 
exclude themselves from representative proceedings (the predeces-
sors of modern class actions) brought against such classes will be dis-
cussed.  The regimes governing defendant class actions and the right 
to opt out of such actions in Ontario, in the Federal Court of Canada 
and in U.S. federal courts will be canvassed in Part III, as well as the 
reports of the various committees upon whose recommendations 
these regimes were based.  Part IV discusses the problems caused by 
the use of opt out regimes in defendant class proceedings and ex-
plores the various approaches that have been taken by Canadian and 
American courts to address these problems. 
II.  DEFENDANT REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
A. The English Court of Chancery 
As was indicated by the United States Supreme Court in 1940: 
The class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a 
decree in suits where the number of those interested in the subject 
of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity 
to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable.  Courts are not in-
frequently called upon to proceed with causes in which the number 
of those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or 
impossible the joinder of all because some are not within the juris-
diction or because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all 
were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death 
of some would prevent or unduly delay a decree.  In such cases 
where the interests of those not joined are of the same class as the 
 
UNIFORM CLASS ACTIONS STATUTE: APPENDIX O TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1995 
MEETING OF THE UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA 5–6, available at 
http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/95pro/e95o.htm (last visited June 28, 2004) (copy on file with 
the author). 
 17. See Part III infra. 
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interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter 
fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the 
issues in which all have a common interest, the court will proceed 
to a decree.18 
This practice, devised by the Court of Chancery, was not limited to 
group litigation involving numerous plaintiffs19 as it also extended to 
litigation involving numerous defendants.20  Indeed, a number of 
commentators have noted that in the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, defendant representative proceedings were as 
prevalent as plaintiff representative proceedings.21  Early proceedings 
against defendant classes included “suits by a landlord against the 
tenants of the manor, represented by only a few actual tenants, to re-
 
 18. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41–42 (1940).  See also Cockburn v. Thompson, 33 Eng. 
Rep. 1005, 1007–08 (1809); Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd., (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255, 261–63; Western 
Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Bennett Jones Verchere, [2001] 201 D.L.R. (4) 385, 394–96 
(McLachlin, C.J.); Chippewas, [1996] 29 O.R.3d at 559; Adair v. New River Co., 11 Ves. 429, 
444–45 (1805); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302 (1853); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797, 808–09 (1985); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832–33 (1999); Montgom-
ery Ward v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 
105 F.R.D. 583, 600 (E.D. Mich. 1985); OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 5–6; Ancheta, supra 
note 5, at 286 n.18; LAW REFORM COMMITTEE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, REPORT RELATING TO 
CLASS ACTIONS 4–5 (Report no. 36 1977) [hereinafter LRCSA REPORT]; Zechariah Chafee, 
Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932); John A. Kazanjian, Class 
Actions in Canada, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 397, 399–411 (1973); COLUM. Note, supra note 11, at 
818; Douglas J. Sherbaniuk, Actions by and Against Trade Unions in Contract and Tort, 12 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 151, 154–55 (1958); Keith Uff, Class, Representative and Shareholders’ Derivative 
Actions in English Law, 5 CIV. JUST. Q. 50, 51 (1986).  
 19. See Mobil Oil Aus. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R. 161, 171 (Gaudron, Gum-
mow & Hayne, JJ.) (“A common example of its use was by one or more creditors of a deceased 
person seeking an account of the deceased’s estate, ascertainment of the deceased’s debt and an 
order for their payment. . . .”).  See also Femcare Ltd. v. Bright (2000) 172 A.L.R. 713, para. 61 
(per Black, C.J., Sackville & Emmett JJ.); Smith, 57 U.S. at 302–03; Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. 
Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (“The modern-day class action is a represen-
tative lawsuit born probably some time during the Middle Ages.”); Schutt Flying Acad. (Aus.) 
Pty. Ltd. v. Mobil Oil Aus. Pty. Ltd. (2000) 1 V.R. 545, 560 n.41 (Ormiston, J.) (stating that the 
first representative suit took place “almost precisely 800 years” before the present rules were 
made); S.J. Stoljar, The Representative Action: An Equitable Post-Mortem, 3 U. W. AUSTL. L. 
REV. 479 (1954). 
 20. See Wood v. McCarthy [1893] 1 Q.B. 775, 777 (Wills, J.) (“For a very long time past the 
Court of Chancery has been in the habit of allowing a certain number of a class of defendants to 
represent the whole body.”); Bromley v. Williams (1863) 32 Beav. 177, 188 (Romilly, MR) (“if 
they are so numerous that they cannot be made parties to the cause . . . , then you may make 
two or three of a class Defendants to represent the interest of all that class”); Taff Vale Railway 
Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 438 (Lord Macnaghten); 
Henson v East Lincoln Township, 108 F.R.D. 107, 111 (C.D. Ill. 1985); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 
946–47; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 462–63. 
 21. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the 
Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 880 (1977); Miller, supra note 5, at 1380; CONTE & 
NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 339; Kruger & Rogers, supra note 11, at 844. 
FINAL MORABITO.DOC 3/8/2005  9:43 AM 
204 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:197 
solve common problems of land tenure suits by a creditor against a 
joint stock enterprise; and suits by a parson against his parishioners to 
collect tithes.”22 
Bilateral representative proceedings, involving representative 
plaintiffs and representative defendants, were also allowed,23 as high-
lighted by the 1853 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v 
Swormstedt.24 
B. The Rules Governing Representative Proceedings 
This practice was retained in post-Judicature systems of proce-
dure and regulated, at first, by Rule 10 of the English Rules of Proce-
dure.25  This rule, which was scheduled to the Supreme Court of Judi-
cature Act 1873, provided that “where there are numerous parties 
having the same interest in one action, one or more of such parties 
may sue or be sued, or may be authorized by the Court to defend in 
such action, on behalf or for the benefit of all parties so interested.”26 
Similar provisions may be found in the rules of procedure that 
currently govern litigation in all Canadian27 and Australian28 jurisdic-
 
 22. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 338. 
 23. See Comm’rs of Sewers of the City of London v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610, 615 (1876) (Jes-
sel, M.R.): “[W]here one multitude of persons were interested in a right, and another multitude 
of persons interested in contesting that right, and that right was a general right . . . some indi-
viduals out of the one multitude might be selected to represent one set of claimants, and an-
other set of persons to represent the parties resisting the claim, and the right might be finally 
decided as between all parties in a suit so constituted.”  For a recent attempt to prosecute a bi-
lateral representative proceeding, see Cauvin v. Philip Morris Ltd. (2003) N.S.W.S.C. 736, paras. 
37–39 (Windeyer, J.). 
 24. 57 U.S. 288 (1853).  “The case in hand illustrates the propriety and fitness of the rule.  
There are some fifteen hundred persons represented by the complainants, and over double that 
number by the defendants.  It is manifest that to require all the parties to be brought upon the 
record, as is required in a suit at law, would amount to a denial of justice.”  Id. at 303. 
 25. See FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 6; Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 396 (McLach-
lin, C.J.); Peter P. Mercer, Group Actions in Civil Procedure in Canada, in CONTEMPORARY 
LAW: CANADIAN REPORTS TO THE 1990 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
249, 252 (1990); Kazanjian, supra note 18, at 412.  In the U.S., “the right to institute a defendant, 
as well as a plaintiff, class action was first codified in 1912 in the Federal Rule of Equity 38, and 
was then recodified in the 1939 version of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.  In 1966, the cur-
rent version of rule 23 was adopted, once again, explicitly permitting the use of defendant class 
actions.”  Holo, supra note 4, at 223.  See also MILLER, supra note 5, at 1383 n.91; CONTE & 
NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 339; and Ancheta, supra note 5, at 286 n.18. 
 26. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 66.  
 27. See FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 6; David A. Crerar, The Restitutionary Class Ac-
tion: Canadian Class Proceedings Legislation as a Vehicle for the Restitution of Unlawfully De-
manded Payments, Ultra Vires Taxes, and Other Unjust Enrichments,  56 U. TORONTO FAC. L. 
REV. 47, 78 n.147 (1998); Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 398. 
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tions.  In Alberta, for instance, Rule 42 provides that “where numer-
ous persons have a common interest in the subject of an intended ac-
tion, one or more of those persons may sue or be sued or may be 
authorised by the court to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of 
all.”29 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently held in Western Ca-
nadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Bennett Jones Verchere30 that repre-
sentative proceedings should be allowed to proceed under Alberta’s 
Rule 42 (and therefore equivalent provisions) where the following 
conditions are met:31 
(1) the class is capable of clear definition; (2) there are issues of fact 
or law common to all class members; (3) success for one class 
member means success for all; and (4) the proposed representative 
adequately represents the interests of the class.  If these conditions 
 
 28. See Justice S. Charles, Class Actions in Australia 2–4 (1996) (unpublished paper pre-
sented at the Australian Bar Association Conference, San Francisco, Cal., on file with author); 
S. Stuart Clark & C. Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A Comparative Perspective, 
11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 289, 293 (2001); Maggie Doyle, The Nature of Representative or 
Class Actions in the Context of Compensation Claims Against Resources and Utilities Companies, 
1999 AUSTL. MINING & PETROLEUM L. ASS’N Y.B. 277, 278 (2000); M. Tilbury, The Possibilities 
for Class Actions in Australian Law 4 (1993) (unpublished paper delivered at the 1993 Austra-
lian Legal Convention in Hobart, Australia, on file with author); Barry Lipp, Mass Tort Class 
Actions under the Federal Court of Australia Act: Justice for All or Justice Denied?, 28 MONASH 
U. L. REV. 360, 362–63 (2002).  In 1982, a unique representation order was sought, in relation to 
a defendant representative proceeding, as one of the proposed representative defendants was 
the then Prime Minister of Australia.  See Tasmania Wilderness Soc’y, Inc. v. Fraser (1982) 153 
C.L.R. 270, 273 (Mason, J.). 
 29. Chief Justice Moore of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench rejected the argument that 
Rule 42 permits only two ways by which a representative action may be commenced: (a) the 
plaintiff may sue on behalf of a plaintiff class if the plaintiff so chooses; and (b) the Court may 
authorize a defendant to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of a group.  Anderson Explora-
tion Ltd. v. PanAlberta Gas Ltd., [1997] 53 Alta. L.R.3d. 204, para. 13.  Chief Justice Moore 
recognized a third scenario: 
Although the Rule does not expressly authorise a defendant to make an application to 
have a plaintiff sue on behalf of a class, neither does the Rule expressly prohibit such 
an application.  As Rule 42 is capable of sustaining a broader interpretation, I see no 
reason to give it a limited interpretation that would have the effect of preventing a de-
fendant from taking a step that may avoid a multiplicity of actions. 
Id. 
 30. [2001] 201 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
 31. These conditions were enunciated by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Korte v. Deloitte, 
Haskins, & Sells, [1993] 135 A.R. 389, paras. 15–22.  The Supreme Court indicated that “the 
Korte criteria loosely parallel the criteria applied in other Canadian jurisdictions in which com-
prehensive class–action legislation has yet to be enacted.”  See Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 
400.  The Supreme Court’s endorsement of Korte has had the desirable effect of ensuring that 
the same criteria are applied by all Canadian Courts with respect to the various, but very simi-
lar, rules governing representative actions.  See Neufeld v. Manitoba, [2002] 24 C.P.C. (5th) 266, 
paras. 6–11; Smith v. Can. (Minister of Indian Affairs & N. Dev.), [2002] F.C.T. 1090, paras. 8–9 
(Hugessen, J.). 
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are met the court must also be satisfied, in the exercise of its discre-
tion, that there are no countervailing considerations that outweigh 
the benefits of allowing the class action to proceed.32 
A number of problems have been encountered in relation to the op-
eration of Rule 42 and its counterparts.33  These problems have re-
sulted in the introduction of comprehensive class action regimes34 in 
the Canadian provinces of Quebec,35 Ontario,36 British Columbia,37 
Saskatchewan,38 Newfoundland and Labrador,39 Manitoba40 and Al-
 
 32. Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 404.  Australia’s counterpart to the Supreme Court, 
the High Court of Australia, has also recognized a judicial power to terminate a properly insti-
tuted representative proceeding.  See Carnie v. Esanda Fin. Corp. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398, 405. 
 33. “The absence of comprehensive legislation means that courts are forced to rely heavily 
on individual case management to structure class proceedings.  This taxes judicial resources and 
denies the parties ex ante certainty as to their procedural rights.”  Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. 
at 399.  See also Mobil Oil Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R. 161, 171 (holding that 
representative proceedings provisions are valid); Pauli v. Ace Ina Ins. (2002) 322 A.R. 126, 
paras. 22–33; ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, ¶¶ 99–100; Kainaiwa/Blood Tribe v. Canada, [2001] 
FTR LEXIS 1385, at *8–10; Ho-A-Shoo v. Attorney-General of Canada, [2000] 47 O.R.3d 115. 
 34. The Scottish Law Commission has described the class action procedure “as a sophisti-
cated and improved version” of the representative action procedure.  See SCOTTISH LAW 
COMMISSION, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 98: MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS: COURT PROCEEDINGS AND 
FUNDING (1994), at ¶ 6.1 [hereinafter SLC REPORT].  See also ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 
xix–xx; ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 5 (“[t]he class action is an extension of representa-
tive actions which originated in the English Chancery Courts.”); Carnie, 182 C.L.R. at 403–04 
(Mason., Deane & Dawson, J.J.) (interpreting representative actions in broad fashion); Justin 
Scott Emerson, Class Actions, 19 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 183, 184 (1989) (describ-
ing the class action procedure in New Zealand); Charles, supra note 28, at 4; Enge v. North 
Slave Metis Alliance, [1999] CarswellNWT 127 (Westlaw), para. 6. 
 35. Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, R.S.Q., ch. C–25, Book IX  (effective as of January 
1979), available at http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-25/20040802/ whole.html (last visited Aug. 
14, 2004) [hereinafter Quebec Code]. 
 36. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O., ch. 6 (1992) (effective as of January 1993), available at 
http://www.canlii.org/on/laws/sta/1992c.6/20040802/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [here-
inafter Ontario Act]. 
 37. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 50 (1996 Can.) (effective as of August 1995), 
available at http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/C/96050_01.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) 
[hereinafter BC Act]. 
 38. Class Action Act, S.S., ch. C–12.01 (2001) (effective as of January 2002), available at 
http://www.canlii.org/sk/laws/sta/c-12.01/20040618/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [here-
inafter Saskatchewan Act]. 
 39. Class Actions Act, NFLD. R.S., ch. C–18.1 (2001 Can.)  (effective as of April 2002), 
available at http://www.canlii.org/nl/laws/sta/c-18.1/20040706/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 
2004) [hereinafter NL Act]. 
 40. Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M. c. C130 (2002) (effective as of January 2003), available 
at http://www.canlii.org/mb/laws/sta/c-130/20040802/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [last 
visited Manitoba Act]. 
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berta41 and in the Federal Court of Canada;42 and in the Federal Court 
of Australia43 and in the Australian States of Victoria44 and South 
Australia.45  Some of the shortcomings of the rules governing repre-
sentative proceedings were recently described as follows by the Su-
preme Court of Canada: 
Alberta’s Rule 42 does not specify what is meant by “numerous” or 
by “common interest”.  It does not say when discovery may be 
made of class members other than the representative.  Nor does it 
specify how notice of the suit should be conveyed to potential class 
members, or how a court should deal with the possibility that some 
potential class members may desire to “opt out” of the class.  And 
it does not provide for costs, or for the distribution of the fund 
should an action for money damages be successful.46 
C. Traditional Judicial Approach to Opt Out Rights 
As was noted above by the Supreme Court, the rules governing 
representative proceedings do not expressly vest courts with the 
power to allow represented persons to exclude themselves from the 
 
 41. Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C–16.6 (2003) (received the royal assent on 16 May 
2003, but is not yet proclaimed), available at http://www.canlii.org/ab/laws/sta/c-16.6/ 
20040430/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Alberta Act]. 
 42. Federal Court Rules 1998 (SOR/98–106), Rules 299.1 to 299.42, available at 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/F-7/SOR-98-106/109744.html#rid-110035 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) 
[hereinafter RC Rules].  This regime commenced in November 2002. 
 43. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, Pt. IVA  [hereinafter Pt. IVA].  This regime 
came into operation in March 1992.  See Mobil Oil Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R. 
161, 169. 
The rules permitting joinder of plaintiffs in one action and the rules providing for rep-
resentative actions . . . came, so it would seem, to be seen as not flexible enough to ac-
commodate all cases in which it would be convenient for there to be only one action to 
determine all the claims that were or could be made by a large number of persons 
against a defendant. . . . Provision has now been made in more than one Australian ju-
risdiction for ‘class’ or ‘group’ actions. 
Id. 
 44. Supreme Court Act, 1986, pt. 4A (Vict., Austl.) [hereinafter pt. 4A].  This regime was 
deemed to have come into operation in January 2000.  See Cook v. Pasminco (2000) VSC 534, 
para. 10 . 
 45. Supreme Court Rules, 1987, Rule 34 (South Austl.). This regime commenced in Janu-
ary 1987. 
 46. Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 399.  See also FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 11–12; 
Interclaim Holdings Ltd. v. Down, [1999] CarswellAlta 1112, para. 4; Ranjoy Sales & Leasing 
Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells, [1984] 27 Man. R.2d. 311, paras. 8–9 (Kroft, J.) (suggesting the 
skeletal nature of Queens Bench Rule 58); Guarantee Co. of N. Am. v. Caisse Populaire de 
Shippagan Ltee., [1988] 86 N.B.R.2d 342, paras. 12–19; Lee v. OCCO Dev. Ltd., [1994] 148 
N.B.R.2d. 321, para. 7 (Creaghan, J.) (referring to the lack of detailed rules governing class ac-
tions); Horne v. Can. (Attorney Gen.), [1995] CarswellPEI 39, para. 25 (MacDonald, C.J.) (in-
dicating Rule 14.01 fails to anticipate many issues in regulating class actions); Julian Donnan, 
Class Actions in Securities Fraud in Australia, 18 CO. & SEC. L.J. 82, 96 (2000). 
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representative proceedings and thereby avoid being bound by the 
outcome of such proceedings.47  The traditional approach to this issue 
has been to deny to members of plaintiff classes the ability to opt 
out.48  Class members who did not wish to be represented by the rep-
resentative plaintiff or who opposed the proceeding could apply to 
the court to be appointed as a defendant in the action49 or to be repre-
sented by a representative defendant.50  The rationale for this regime 
was described as follows by an English judge, Justice Megarry, in 
1969: “It seems to me that the important thing is to have before the 
court, either in person or by representation, all who will be affected: 
and provided that the issue will be fairly argued out.”51 
A similar approach has been followed in the context of defen-
dant representative proceedings.52  As was indicated by Lord Justice 
Staughton of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Irish Shipping 
Ltd. v. Commercial Union: “The legal advisers of Commercial Union 
and Alliance [the representative defendants] are no doubt capable of 
arguing that point; and I am confident that the foreign insurers [some 
 
 47. See also ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 5; ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 445; 
Femcare Ltd v. Bright (2000) 172 A.L.R 713, ¶ 87 (“The representative procedure stemming 
from the practice of the Court of Chancery did not make provision for a represented party to 
opt out.”).  But see Richard York, All Together Now: Standard Term Contracts and Representa-
tive Actions, 10 J. CONT. L. 85, 92 (1996) (“[A]n ‘opt–out’ procedure may actually be required 
by the words of rule 13(1) [of the NSW Supreme Court Rules].  The rule allows a representative 
action to be continued on behalf of ‘all except one or more of’ the represented persons.  This 
clause, at least, requires the court to consider any application from a represented person who 
independently seeks to opt out of a representative action.”). 
 48. Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 558–59; ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 100; Neil An-
drews, Multi-Party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 252 (2001); Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corp. Ltd. (1996) 38 N.S.W.L.R. 
465, 472 (“[T]he old equity procedure did not involve opting in or opting out.”).  See also Markt 
& Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd., 2 K.B. 1021, 1039 (C.A. 1910) (“The plaintiff is the 
self-elected representative of the others.  He has not to obtain their consent.  It is true that con-
sequently they are not liable for costs, but they will be bound by the estoppel created by the de-
cision.”); Sykes v. One Big Union, [1936] 43 Man. R. 542, 550; Kazanjian, supra note 18, at 422. 
 49. Wilson v. Church, 9 Ch. D. 552, 558–59 (1878); Watson v. Cave, No. 1, 17 Ch. D. 19, 21 
(1881); Hancock v. Scattergood (1955) S.A. St. R. 1, 20; John v. Rees, 2 All E.R. 274, 284 (1969); 
May v. Newton, 34 Ch. D. 347, 349 (1887); Fraser v. Cooper, Hall, & Co., 21 Ch. D. 718, 719 
(1882). 
 50. Fraser, 21 Ch. D. at 719; Hancock,  S.A. St. R. at 20; John, 2 All E.R. at 284.  At the 
same time, courts have displayed a willingness to “redefine the class to exclude any persons 
where there is evidence, either at trial or before, that indicates that such a person my be preju-
diced if included in the class.”  Ranjoy Sales & Leasing Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, [1985] 
16 D.L.R. (4th) 218, 230.  See also Anderson Exploration Ltd. v. PanAlberta Gas Ltd., [1997] 53 
Alta. L.R.3d 204, para. 29. 
 51. John, 2 All E.R. at 284.  But see Smith v. Cardiff Corporation, 1 Q.B. 210, 222 (1954). 
 52. See, e.g., Clark v. Univ. of Melbourne (1978) V.R. 457, 477. 
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of the defendant class members] would trust them to argue it.  If I am 
wrong about that, one or more of the foreign insurers can apply to be 
joined as defendants.”53 
The 1996 judgment of Justice Adams of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney 
General)54 is consistent with the traditional judicial reluctance to em-
ploy opt out regimes, highlighted above.  The proceedings in Chippe-
was involved the first attempt to seek certification of a defendant 
class under the Ontario Act.  The proposed representative defendants 
argued that such a certification would not be appropriate given that it 
was likely that most members of the class would simply opt out of the 
proceeding.55  In response to this submission the court indicated that if 
that scenario eventuated it would consider making an order that the 
proceedings proceed as a defendant representative proceeding, pur-
suant to Rule 12.7, Ontario’s counterpart to Alberta’s Rule 42.  This 
proposed strategy clearly suggests that, in the court’s view, repre-
sented persons could not opt out of defendant representative pro-
ceedings.56 
D. Contemporary Judicial Approach to Opt Out Rights 
The judicial approach described above appears to have been 
abandoned by most contemporary courts.  In Australia, in the 1996 
case of Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corp Ltd.,57 Justice Young of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales indicated that the traditional ap-
proach—of not allowing class members to exit the proceedings—was 
appropriate when proceedings involved a joint right or a general 
right.  Yet, in other cases, the proper approach to apply was to choose 
between an opt in model58 and an opt out model.59  Justice Young  
considered that in the plaintiff representative proceeding before him, 
 
 53. 3 All E.R. 853, 862 (C.A. 1989). See also Parr v. Lancashire & Cheshire Miners’ Fed-
eration, 1 Ch. 366, 375 (1913) (“What is wanted is a sufficient representation, and if the execu-
tive committee or if the trustees had desired to be added as defendants in this action, there is no 
question that upon application they could have been added as defendants. . . .”). 
 54. Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 549. 
 55. Id. at 568. 
 56. See ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 448 n.385. 
 57. (1996) 38 N.S.W.L.R. 465. 
 58. Id. at 469.  (“[W]ith opt-in, a person does not become one of the represented parties 
unless he or she makes a deliberate decision to be counted amongst those represented.”). 
 59. Id. at 472. (“Whatever its origin, the opt-in or opt-out procedure has now been ac-
cepted in most of the common law world which has adopted class actions as being a convenient 
system in order to notify people of proceedings in the court which might affect them.”). 
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an opt in procedure was appropriate.60  In the same year, another jus-
tice of the same court, Justice Bryson, indicated that an opt in regime 
would, in most cases, be preferable to an opt out regime.61  Similarly, 
in 1997, Justice Sackville of the Federal Court of Australia made the 
following comments in relation to a defendant representative pro-
ceeding: 
It seems to me that, before a representative order could be made 
(assuming this was ultimately considered to be the appropriate 
course), an appropriate effort should be made to ascertain whether 
the Agencies [the represented persons] themselves consider it ap-
propriate to be joined in the proceedings through a representative 
order and whether they accept that their interests are the same as 
the State [the representative defendant] and other Agencies.62 
In the 1990s a number of Canadian courts also began to embrace opt 
in regimes in relation to plaintiff representative actions.  In Enge v. 
North Slave Metis Alliance, for instance, Justice Vertes of the North-
west Territories Supreme Court ordered the representative plaintiffs 
to: 
 
 60. Id. at 473. (“[W]hen one has the situation that there is a potential liability on the mem-
ber of the group.”).  Judge Young also indicated that notices should be sent to all represented 
persons, in order to allow the Court to make an informed decision as to whether or not it should 
order the discontinuance of the representative proceeding.  See also Robin Trigge, Representa-
tive Actions under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 21 QUEENSL. LAW. 110, 112, 114–15 
(2001); John Wilkin, Representative Proceedings in Victoria: No Change in Contract Cases?, 
70(8) L. INST. J. 36, 38–39 (1996); Proposal for a New Supreme Court Rule on Representative 
Proceedings in NSW (Centre for Legal Process of the NSW Law Foundation and Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, N.S.W., Austl. 1998), at ¶ 4.3.3 [hereinafter NSW Law Foundation]. 
 61. Bryson stated: 
“The court should only decide that some person who has not clearly stated his position should 
be involved in proceedings where it is impractical to obtain a decision from that person for some 
reason such as minority or incapacity, or where there is an overwhelming probability that such a 
person would wish to be involved.  If it is possible to consult them, the court should not make 
any paternalistic assumption about its capacity to decide on behalf of others that proceedings 
are to be brought on their behalf. I would think there would be few occasions when what was 
referred to as an ‘opt out’ notice would be appropriate.”  Shepherd v. Aus. & N.Z. Group Ltd. 
(1996) 20 A.C.S.R. 81, 100–01.  But see Rugby Union Players Ass’n. v. Australian Rugby Union 
Ltd., 1997 NSW LEXIS 959, at *45 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W. 1997) (Giles, C.J.). 
[T]he parties adverted to the adoption of an ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ procedure. . . .Given 
the paucity of relevant evidence, an ‘opt-out’ procedure should certainly not be 
adopted, and even an ‘opt-in’ procedure whereby the fifth defendant represented 
Players who consented to being represented would, it seems to me, leave an unaccept-
able risk that the different positions of consenting Players would not be adequately ex-
posed. 
Id. 
 62. BT Australasia, 1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 1068, at *87.  See also Morgan’s Brewery 
Co. v. Crosskill, 1 Ch. 898, 900 (1908) (“I am not prepared to decide the questions raised in the 
absence of the other members of the [defendant] class, so as to bind them, unless the class has 
been consulted.”). 
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give notice of these proceedings, to be published in two consecutive 
issues of a newspaper of general circulation in Yellowknife, inviting 
anyone who may allegedly be part of the class represented to iden-
tify themselves to counsel for the plaintiffs. The notice will also 
provide that at the expiry of 60 days from the date of the second 
publication the class will be closed.63 
It was not until July 2001 that the Supreme Court of Canada was re-
quired to consider this issue.  In Western Canadian, Chief Justice 
McLachlin, speaking for a unanimous court, indicated that: 
[a] judgment is binding on a class member only if the class member 
is notified of the suit and is given an opportunity to exclude himself 
or herself from the proceeding.  This case does not raise the issue of 
what constitutes sufficient notice.  However, prudence suggests that 
all potential class members be informed of the existence of the suit, 
of the common issues that the suit seeks to resolve, and of the right 
of each class member to opt out, and that this be done before any 
decision is made that purports to prejudice or otherwise affect the 
interests of class members.64 
Curiously, despite this clear directive from the Supreme Court, a 
number of Canadian courts have adopted an approach similar to that 
enunciated in the Australian case of Carnie65 by holding that a deci-
sion needs to be made, on the facts of the case, between an opt in 
model and an opt out model.66  In one case, a judicial decision, in fa-
vor of an opt in scheme, was made.67  In another plaintiff representa-
tive action, it was held that non-exclusion from the class is appropri-
ate where “the right to opt out is meaningless.  It is meaningless, as a 
 
 63. [1999] CarswellNWT 127, para. 17.  See also Holtslag v. Alberta, [2000] 263 A.R. 394, 
para. 13 (Binder, J.); Olsen v. Alberta Hail & Crop Ins. Corp. [1995] CarswellAlta 41. 
 64. Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 404.  The power and duty of the Court presiding over 
representative proceedings to ensure that class members are provided with adequate notice of 
the proceedings have also been recognized by the High Court of Australia.  See Carnie v. 
Esanda Fin. Corp. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398, 422.  The judicial recognition of this duty addresses 
the following criticism of the practice of not allowing class members to exit the proceedings, 
formulated by the Ontario Law Reform Commission: “[the rules governing representative pro-
ceedings do] not require that notice of the action be given to the class.  As a result, class mem-
bers who may wish to apply to be made defendants may well be unaware of the existence of the 
action.”  OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 469. 
 65. This is a strange scenario given that Western Canadian is “now the leading case on class 
actions in jurisdictions . . . without comprehensive rules and/or legislative schemes governing 
class actions.”  Neufeld v. Manitoba, [2001] CarswellMan 563, para. 3 (Hamilton, J.). 
 66. See, e.g., Scott v. St. Boniface Gen. Hosp., [2002] 11 WWR 463, 471, para. 29 (MacIn-
nes, J.); Lloyd v. Imperial Oil Ltd, [2003] CarswellAlta 751, para. 37 (Fraser, J.). 
 67. “The Plaintiffs may give notice of these proceedings to the other 30 investors, giving 
them 30 days to join the action.”  Metera v. Financial Planning Group, [2003] CarswellAlta 516, 
para. 42 (Slatter, J.). 
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practical matter, if the member would be affected by a decision of the 
court notwithstanding an informed decision to opt out.”68 
E. Call for a Return to Non-Exclusion from Defendant Representa-
tive Proceedings 
It is submitted that, in relation to defendant representative pro-
ceedings, a return to the traditional approach is called for.  Opt in re-
gimes have been correctly rejected by most law reform bodies69 and 
commentators70 as they drastically reduce the size of potential classes 
sought to be represented by representative plaintiffs.71  This adverse 
impact of opt in regimes would be even more pronounced in defen-
dant representative proceedings given that, unlike plaintiff class 
members, defendant class members would be exposed to potential li-
ability, in the event of an outcome of the representative proceeding 
 
 68. Taylor v. Alta. Teachers’ Ass’n, [2002] A.B.Q.B 554, para. 7. 
If the plaintiffs are successful in this action, the remedy obtained will be an order di-
recting the defendant to repay administrative costs withdrawn from the plan and to 
stop this activity in the future. The opting out by any class member or group of mem-
bers could not change this potential outcome or affect the individual rights of someone 
choosing to opt out. 
Id. at para. 8. 
 69. See, e.g., MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CLASS PROCEEDINGS 63–66 (Report 
No. 100 1999) [hereinafter MLRC REPORT]; ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 242 (“An opt in 
requirement would be fundamentally inconsistent with the access to justice rationale endorsed 
as a basic justification for expanded class proceedings legislation. That is to say, making justice 
available is the predominant policy concern and inclusiveness in the class should be promoted. 
People who are vulnerable should be swept in”); Ministry of the Attorney General, British Co-
lumbia, Consultation Document: Class Action Litigation for British Columbia 8 (1994) (“[the 
opt out model is] the more effective means to ensure that the barriers to justice, which class ac-
tions are intended to overcome, are reduced.”). 
 70. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 3, 20–
1 (1983); RAND INST. CIV. JUST., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 26 (1999) (“In consumer class actions involving small 
individual losses, requiring class members to opt in would lead to smaller classes that would 
likely obtain smaller aggregate settlements. . . . The social science research on active versus pas-
sive assent suggests that minority and low-income individuals might be disproportionately af-
fected by an opt-in requirement, a worrisome possibility.”), available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.1/MR969.1.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004). 
 71. See e.g., Vince Morabito, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out Under Part IVA of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 615, 627–35 (1994).  See also 
NSW Law Foundation, supra note 60, at ¶ 4.3.3 (“[T]he notion that people can only be part of a 
representative proceeding by providing consent to opt-in makes the procedure tantamount to 
joinder.  Three judges of the Victorian Supreme Court have described the Victorian opt–in 
model as akin to joinder, and quite distinct from the popular notion of representative proceed-
ings.  Arguably this is inconsistent with the rule which contains no explicit requirement for con-
sent.  The concept of representation is consistent with having a constituency rather than the 
consent of being appointed as an agent.”). 
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which is not favorable to the class, and therefore have a greater incen-
tive not to opt in.72 
While opt out regimes are vastly superior to opt in regimes, it is 
submitted that they should not be applied with respect to defendant 
representative proceedings.  The crucial distinction between plaintiff 
class members and defendant class members, for the purpose of this 
issue, was aptly explained by the Alberta Law Reform Institute 
(ALRI): 
Generally speaking, plaintiffs choose who they will name as defen-
dants in their lawsuits, and the only way that someone so named 
can remove themselves from the lawsuit at an early stage is by es-
tablishing that there is no foundation for the plaintiff’s claim 
against them.  In short, the ordinary civil litigation would not be 
terribly effective if defendants could choose to opt out of lawsuits.  
In considering whether members of a defendant class should have 
the right to opt out or not, we think the more appropriate analogy 
is with defendants in ordinary actions than with members of the 
plaintiff class in a plaintiff class action.  On this basis we do not 
think that members of the defendant class should have the right to 
opt out of the proceeding.73 
The rules governing representative proceedings themselves draw a 
distinction between proceedings brought by representative plaintiffs 
and proceedings brought against representative defendants.  The 
former may be prosecuted without the need to first seek court au-
thorization.74  Court authorization is, instead, essential in relation to 
 
 72. “The crux of the distinction is: the unnamed plaintiff stands to gain while the unnamed 
defendant stands to lose.”  Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n, 97 F.R.D. 668, 674 
(N.D. Ill. 1983). 
 73. ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 464.  The reasoning of the ALRI renders inapplica-
ble to defendant representative proceedings the following criticism of the judicial practice of 
requiring those class members who wish to opt out to apply to the Court to be appointed as de-
fendants, put forward by the Ontario Law Reform Commission: “A problem lies in the degree 
of activity demanded of the class member. Requiring a person who prefers to be excluded from 
the class to apply to the court usually will necessitate the services of a lawyer, with attendant 
costs in time and money.  Thus, even if the class member somehow becomes aware of the class 
action and determines to seek exclusion from the class, he will be obliged to take a relatively 
expensive and cumbersome route to achieve this end.”  OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 469. 
 74. “Although [the rule governing representative proceedings] requires that a representa-
tive defendant be appointed or authorized by the court to defend the action on behalf of a de-
fendant class, a representative plaintiff requires no authorization.  In other words, a representa-
tive plaintiff may well be a self–appointed advocate of the class.  The absence of court approval 
of the representative plaintiff results in the distinct possibility that the class plaintiff may be an 
inadequate representative of the class.  Given the binding effect of the judgment in a class ac-
tion, the consequences for the other members of the class could be very prejudicial.”  OLRC 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 33.  See also Kazanjian, supra note 18, at 422. 
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defendant representative proceedings.75  As was noted by the Su-
preme Court of British Columbia in Kuzych v. White:76 
In my view, [the rule governing representative proceedings] gives 
the plaintiff the right to select representative defendants when he 
issues his writ.  He then proceeds at his own risk unless he satisfies 
the court at some stage of the proceedings that the persons so se-
lected are proper persons for the court to recognize as representing 
numerous persons having the same interest in the cause.77 
There are only two legitimate reasons that a represented person 
may have for wishing to opt out of a defendant representative pro-
ceeding.  One is a desire to have greater control over proceedings that 
might expose that person to liability.78  But that need may be fulfilled 
by allowing such represented person to be appointed as a named de-
fendant.  As was explained above, this has been the approach tradi-
tionally adopted by courts to deal with those represented persons who 
did not wish to be represented by the named parties. 
Another legitimate reason that a defendant class member may 
have for desiring to exit a defendant representative proceeding is a 
 
 75. “[The rule], in the form in which it is expressed, raises a question as to which I do not 
propose to decide anything, but it is strange that it runs thus as regards defendants.  Reading the 
words relevant to defendants its language is ‘one or more of such persons may be sued or may 
be authorised by the Court or a judge to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so 
interested.’  One or more may therefore be sued on behalf of all or may be authorised to defend 
on behalf of all.  If all can effectually be sued, it would be strange if all could not effectually de-
fend.  Can the rule mean that while all may be sued by representatives they cannot defend un-
less the Court gives authority to do so?”  Walker v. Sur, [1914] 2 K.B. 930, 935 (Buckley, L.J.).  
See also Sherbaniuk, supra note 18, at 165–66. 
 76. [1952] 6 W.W.R. 567, 571–72.  See also Roche v. Sherrington, [1982] 2 All E.R. 426, 428 
(Slade, J.); Walker, 2 K.B. at 935; Barrett v. Harris, [1921] 51 O.L.R. 484, 491 (Middleton, J.) (“I 
should add that an order authorising the defendants to represent the class is, by the Rule, 
equally essential.”). 
 77. [1952] 6 W.W.R. 567, 571–72.  Justice Van Camp of the Ontario Supreme Court (High 
Court of Justice) has explained that “there is no time limit specified. . . . However, the words 
‘may be authorized by the court to defend on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all’ indicate to me 
that the time for obtaining a representation order is before any defence is submitted.  It is diffi-
cult to accept that it can be done at any time because this could put the defendants in the posi-
tion right up until trial of not knowing whether the action will ever be properly constituted.”  
Dionisio v. Allain, [1985] 50 C.P.C. 11, para. 23.  Without a representation order, “it would ap-
pear that those members of the class not named in the suit will not be bound by the proceed-
ings.”  OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 33 n.155.  See also BERNARD C. CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 254 (5th ed. 2002). 
 78. See, e.g., Parsons & Starr, supra note 5, at 892; Gross, supra note 5, at 624; Diane P. 
Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 607–08 (1987) (“There has 
been a sense, however, that special solicitude is necessary toward the members of defendant 
classes. Any defendant, after all, hardly welcomes the idea of involvement in litigation. To be 
told . . . or to learn somehow that one is a defendant, but someone else is in charge of the law-
suit, seems even worse.”). 
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belief that the representative defendant is not adequately representa-
tive of the interests of the class.79  But class members may request the 
court to replace the existing representatives or to appoint additional 
representatives.80 
It is also important to note that courts have implemented a num-
ber of safeguards designed to ensure that the interests of those repre-
sented by representative defendants are protected,81 including, of 
course, the withholding of a representation order.82  As these meas-
ures are similar to those employed in proceedings brought pursuant 
to class action regimes, they will be referred to throughout the study 
of defendant class actions developed in Part IV below.83 
 
 79. See ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 466; Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Meth-
ode Elec. Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 529 (N.D. 
Ind. 1975); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Sebo v. Ruben-
stein, 188 F.R.D. 310, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 80. See Nat’l Supply Co. Ltd. v. Greenbank, [1941] 3 W.W.R. 711, 714. 
[I]t is to be open to any one or more holders of royalty trust certificates to apply to 
have an additional person or persons appointed as a further representative of any class 
and added as a defendant if for any reason [the representative defendant] be consid-
ered by him or them as not qualified to represent all the certificate holders. 
Id. 
 81. The High Court of Australia has drawn attention to “the capacity of the court manag-
ing representative proceedings to control the proceedings in such a manner as to ensure fair-
ness, a capacity usually conferred by wide discretionary powers in relation to the conduct of the 
action.”  Mobil Oil Aus. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R 161, 172 (Gleeson, C.J.).  See 
also John v. Rees, 2 All E.R. 274, 283 (Ch. 1969); Taff Vale Railway Company v. Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 443; David Kell, Comment, Evolution of Repre-
sentative Actions, 1993 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 306, 306, 308; RJ Flowers Ltd. v. Burns 
[1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 260, 282; Farnham v. Fingold, [1973] 2 O.R. 132, 136; Uff, supra note 18, at 64; 
Carnie v. Esanda Fin. Corp. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398, 422 (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.) (“The simplic-
ity of the rule is also one of its strengths, allowing it to be treated as a flexible rule of conven-
ience in the administration of justice. “); Interclaim Holdings Ltd. v. Down, [1999] A.C.W.S.J. 
LEXIS 54229, at *15–16 (Kent, J.); Ranjoy Sales and Leasing Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins and 
Sells, [1985] 16 D.L.R. (4th) 218, 221 (Monnin, CJM); Van Audenhove v. Nova Scotia (Attor-
ney General), [1994] 134 N.S.R.2d 294, paras. 19–20. 
 82. See, e.g., Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 435; Walker, 2 K.B. at 930; Roche, 2 All 
E.R. at 426; BT Australasia, 1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS at *1068; London Ass’n for Protection 
of Trade v. Greenlands, Ltd., 2 A.C. 15, 39 (1916); Barker v Allanson, [1937] 1 K.B. 463, 473, 
475–76 (Greer, L.J.); Cauvin, (2003) N.S.W.S.C. at 736; Jillaine Seymour, Representative Proce-
dures and the Future of Multi–Party Actions, 62 MOD. L. REV. 564, 572–74 (1999); J.F. Keeler, 
Contractual Actions for Damages Against Unincorporated Bodies, 34 MOD. L. REV. 615, 616 
(1971); Geddes v. Australasian Meat Indus. Employees’ Union (1917) 17 N.S.W. St. R. 119; At-
torney General for Victoria v. City of Brighton (1964) V.R. 59; United Kingdom Nirex Ltd. v. 
Barton [Oct. 13, 1986], Unreported, Q.B. (Henry, J.); Elec. Comm. of New South Wales v. Ar-
row (1990) 0001 NSW LEXIS 153119; Mar. Union of Aus. v. Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty. 
Ltd. (1998) 4 V.R. 143; Carnie, 182 C.L.R. at 408; Geelong Wool Combing, Ltd. v. Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia (2003) F.C.R. 773, para. 12 (Finkelstein, J.); Cauvin 
v. Philip Morris Ltd (2003) N.S.W.S.C. 631. 
 83. See infra notes 179, 181, 188, 189, 192, 194–196, 198, 201, 203 and 215.  
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III.  DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS 
A. Defendant Class Proceedings in Ontario 
As was noted above, Ontario was the first and, until November 
2002, only Canadian jurisdiction with a comprehensive class proceed-
ing regime that enables the certification of defendant classes.  The 
origins of the Ontario Act, which came into effect in January 1993, 
may be traced back to the outstanding study of the class action device 
undertaken by the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) in 
1982.84  After providing a brief summary of the major features of de-
fendant class proceedings, the OLRC made no recommendations 
with respect to defendant class actions, as it was of the view that these 
actions raised distinct issues which necessitated a separate study.85  A 
similar conclusion was reached by the Australian Law Reform Com-
mission (ALRC) in 1988.86  Class action reform in Ontario was con-
sidered again in 1990, this time by the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee on Class Action Reform (Ontario Committee).87  The On-
tario Committee’s proposed class action legislation included sections 
3(2), (3) and (4), which are set out below: 
 
 84. See generally OLRC REPORT, supra note 5 (tracing the history of, outlining the costs 
and benefits of, and suggesting alternatives to class actions in Ontario). 
 85. According to the OLRC REPORT: 
Defendant class actions raise many issues similar to those encountered in plaintiff class 
actions.  This is apparent from a review of the case law under Rule 23.  Among the is-
sues that have arisen are the following: the adequacy of a member of the class to repre-
sent the class; the need for notice to members of the class regarding the action; the 
costs of the class action and the representative defendant’s responsibility for those 
costs; the right of members of the class to remove themselves from the class by ‘opting 
out’; the determination of individual issues once the common questions have been re-
solved; and settlement.  However, while many of these issues are common to both 
plaintiff and defendant class actions, the solutions required in the defendant class ac-
tion context may be quite different and, in our view, merit separate study. 
Id. at 43–44. 
 86. According to the ALRC: 
Representative defendant actions have the potential to impose direct liability on a 
member of the group.  There is a strong argument for personal notice to be given to 
members of a defendant group.  There may also be stronger arguments for ensuring 
that group members have general rights to opt out or intervene.  These differences 
suggest that special rules may be needed to meet particular issues arising for defendant 
class actions.  The issues merit separate study.  The Commission makes no recommen-
dations with respect to defendant classes in this report.  The existing representative 
procedure should, however, be retained to enable defendant representative actions to 
be brought in appropriate circumstances. 
ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 6.  See also NSW Law Foundation, supra note 60, at ¶ 4.2.2. 
 87. MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CLASS ACTION REFORM (1990) [hereinafter ONTARIO 
COMMITTEE]. 
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(2) At any stage of a proceeding any party may move for an order 
requesting named defendants to defend the proceeding as a class 
and for an order appointing a defendant as the representative de-
fendant. 
(3) An order appointing a member of the class as the representa-
tive . . . defendant shall only be made with the consent of the per-
son upon such terms as the court considers appropriate. 
(4) On a motion pursuant [to subs (2)] or with respect to a resulting 
order the provisions of this Act with respect to certification apply 
mutatis mutandis.88 
The Ontario Committee’s explanation of the rationale for rec-
ommending the certification of defendant classes was limited to the 
following comment: “[T]he Committee anticipates the need for de-
fendant class proceedings and developed this provision to ensure that 
such proceedings were available and mirrored plaintiff class proceed-
ings.”89  It is immediately apparent that there was no recognition on 
the part of the Ontario Committee of the distinctive features of de-
fendant class proceedings adverted to by the OLRC and the ALRC.  
In light of the fact that the Ontario legislature implemented most of 
the Ontario Committee’s recommendations, it is not surprising that 
defendant class proceedings brought under the Ontario Act are gov-
erned by the regimes, procedures and requirements that govern, and 
were designed for, plaintiff class proceedings.90 
Section 5 sets out five prerequisites for certification under the 
Ontario Act.  The first requirement is that the pleadings disclose a 
cause of action.91  The second requirement is that there be an identifi-
 
 88. Id  Rule 3.501(I)(2) of the Michigan Court Rules is broadly similar to the Ontario 
Committee’s § 3(3) as it provides that “a representative of a defendant class, other than a public 
body or a public officer, may decline to defend the action in a representative capacity unless the 
court finds that the convenient administration of justice otherwise requires.” 
 89. ONTARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 87, at 29–30. 
 90. The operation of statutes of limitations with respect to defendant class actions provides 
another major illustration of the problems created by the application to defendant classes, with-
out alteration, of measures directed to members of plaintiff classes.  Section 28 of the Ontario 
Act suspends the operation of such statutes for class members upon the filing of a class proceed-
ing.  But cf. Berry, [2001] Ont Sup CJ LEXIS 499, at *21 (Cumming, J.).  The Court noted that 
Section 28 “would seem to operate only in favour of a plaintiff class against a named individual 
defendant(s).  Where a limitation period has expired it is problematical for a plaintiff to later 
add defendants.”  To deal with this problem, the plaintiffs in Berry indicated to the Court that 
they would commence a new plaintiff class action, naming each of the defendant class members 
as individual defendants. 
 91. The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that: 
[T]he class representative must show some basis in fact for each of the certification re-
quirements set out in s. 5 of the Act, other than the requirement that the pleadings dis-
close a cause of action.  That latter requirement is of course governed by the rule that a 
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able class of two or more persons92 that would be represented by the 
representative plaintiff or defendant.  The third requirement is that 
the claims or defenses of the class members raise common issues.  
The fourth requirement is that a class proceeding would be the pref-
erable procedure for the resolution of the common issues.  The final 
requirement is that there be a representative plaintiff or defendant 
who would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class; 
has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable 
method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of no-
tifying class members of the proceeding;93 and does not have, on the 
common issues for the class, an interest in conflict with the interests 
of other class members.94 
The ability to commence defendant class proceedings, which is 
implied in Section 5, is made explicit by Section 4, providing that “any 
party to a proceeding against two or more defendants may, at any 
stage of the proceeding, make a motion to a judge of the court for an 
order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding and appointing a 
representative defendant.”95  Another crucial provision of the Ontario 
Act, for present purposes, is Section 8(1)(f) which provides that an 
order certifying a proceeding as a class proceeding must specify the 
 
pleading should not be struck for failure to disclose a cause of action unless it is ‘plain 
and obvious’ that no claim exists. 
Hollick v. Toronto (City), [2001] 205 D.L.R. (4th) 19, 33. 
 92. See Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R at 401.  (“[T]he class must be capable of clear defini-
tion.  Class definition is critical because it identifies the individuals entitled to notice, entitled to 
relief (if relief is awarded), and bound by the judgment.  It is essential, therefore, that the class 
be defined clearly at the outset of the litigation.  The definition should state objective criteria by 
which members of the class can be identified”.)  See also Prestage & McKee, supra note 8, at 
226. 
 93. This requirement has generated some difficulties in relation to representative defen-
dants.  See Chippewas, [1996] 29 O.R.3d at 570–72; Berry, Ont Sup CJ LEXIS 499, at 23–24 
(Cumming, J.). 
 94. Two differences are apparent between the provisions of the Ontario Act governing de-
fendant class actions and the provisions recommended by the Ontario Committee.  The Ontario 
Committee’s proposed Section 3(3) imposed the requirement that the representative defendants 
provide their consent before assuming such a role.  No similar provision appears in the Ontario 
Act.  Secondly, the Ontario Act does not, unlike the provisions recommended by the Ontario 
Committee, provide that the provisions with respect to certification apply mutatis mutandis to 
defendant class proceedings. 
 95. “The respondents say it is up to the plaintiffs to decide who they want to sue; a party 
cannot simply decide on its own to become a defendant.  In my view, s 4 relates to the com-
mencement of a class action.  It deals with a situation where an ordinary action has been com-
menced and a party decides to seek an order certifying it as a class action and appointing a rep-
resentative defendant.  The words ‘at any stage of the proceeding’ relate to the original action, 
not the class action once it is certified.”  Woods,  17 C.P.C. (4th) at 382, paras. 15–16 (MacPher-
son, J.). 
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manner in which class members may opt out of the class proceeding 
and a date after which class members may not opt out.  Any class 
member may opt out of the proceeding in the manner and within the 
time specified in the certification order.96 
The Ontario Committee expressed, as follows, its clear prefer-
ence for the opt out model: 
This provision sets out a class member’s entitlement to withdraw 
from the class proceedings and, if desired, start an individual pro-
ceeding. . . . The value of such a model is that defendants to class 
proceedings are assured that they face all potential claimants in the 
one law suit.  Those who opt-out can be specifically identified and 
dealt with on that basis.  The opt-out model also increases the ef-
fectiveness of a class proceeding by not requiring potential litigants 
to take steps to be in the suit.  This is particularly so in cases involv-
ing individual claims that are relatively small.97 
The Ontario Committee’s comments above highlight, unambigu-
ously, that its selection of the opt out model was based solely on the 
needs of plaintiff class members.  No consideration was given by the 
Ontario Committee to the crucial issues of (a) whether the conferral 
of an opt out right upon members of defendant classes would serve 
any useful purpose, and (b) whether an opt out procedure is consis-
tent with the objectives of defendant class proceedings. 
B. Defendant Class Actions in the Federal Court of Canada 
The Federal Court Rules 1998 were amended by SOR/2002-417 
to include Rules 299.1 to 299.42, in order to introduce a detailed 
framework to govern class actions before the Federal Court of Can-
ada (FC Rules).  These new rules came into operation in November 
2002.  This regime was based on the recommendations contained in a 
discussion paper, released in December 2000, by the Rules Commit-
tee of the Federal Court (FC Committee).98  The FC Committee 
noted that there is no reason, in principle, for not permitting defen-
dant class proceedings, as it would be unfair to deprive litigants “of 
the access and efficiencies of class actions when a claim is directed 
against a group (as opposed to on its behalf).”99  But the FC Commit-
tee also drew attention to the fact that the rules governing class ac-
 
 96. Ontario Act § 9. 
 97. ONTARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 87, at 33–34. 
 98. FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5. 
 99. Id. at 35. 
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tions should make it clear that “the criteria for certification . . . should 
apply as appropriate to the certification of a defendant class.”100 
This last comment evinces a recognition, on the part of the FC 
Committee, of the fact that some of the procedures governing plain-
tiff class actions may not be suitable for governing defendant classes.  
Disappointingly, this finding did not prompt the FC Committee to 
identify those areas where procedures, tailored specifically for defen-
dant class proceedings, are called for.  This weakness in the approach 
of the FC Committee is vividly highlighted by its discussion of its 
preference for opt out regimes.  In reaching the conclusion that “the 
ability to opt out should be a right that members of the class can exer-
cise,”101 no distinction is drawn by the FC Committee between plain-
tiff classes and defendant classes.  A failure to ascertain whether the 
needs and circumstances of members of plaintiff classes, which justify 
the employment of opt out regimes, are the same as those of defen-
dant class members is evident. 
The implementation of most of the FC Committee’s recommen-
dations has resulted in a regime where defendant class proceedings 
are referred to in only two provisions: Rule 299.15 and Rule 
299.16(2).  The former provision provides that “a party to an action 
against two or more defendants may, at any time, bring a motion for 
the certification of the action as a class action and the appointment of 
a representative defendant.”  Meanwhile, Rule 299.16(2) provides 
that the other provisions found in the FC Rules, addressing plaintiff 
class actions, “apply, with the necessary modifications” to defendant 
class proceedings.102  No guidance is provided to the court as to what 
the concept of “necessary modifications” entails.  More importantly, 
it is not clear whether this power to effect necessary modifications 
would authorize the court to remove privileges from defendant class 
members, such as the right to opt out, which are extended to all class 
members by the FC Rules.103 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 59. 
 102. It is interesting to note that this provision refers to all of the provisions governing class 
actions applying to defendant class proceedings with “necessary modifications” whilst the FC 
Committee’s recommendation envisaged necessary modifications, in relation to defendant 
classes, only of the criteria for certification.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 103. Rule 299.23(1) allows class members to opt out of the class action in the manner and 
within the time specified in the certification order. 
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C. The Uniform Class Proceedings Act, the Alberta Law Reform 
Institute and the U.S. Uniform Class Actions Act 
As was explained above, the employment of opt out regimes in 
all class proceedings, in Ontario and in the Federal Court of Canada, 
including those brought against defendant classes, stemmed from a 
failure of the committees, whose proposals formed the basis of the 
Ontario Act and the FC Rules, to turn their attention to the likely 
impact of opt out regimes on defendant class proceedings.  On the 
other hand, the Alberta legislature was recently placed in a very ad-
vantageous position, as far as this issue was concerned.  In fact, in its 
2000 study of class actions, the ALRI did consider the ability of the 
defendant class action device to achieve some of its major objectives 
(such as access to justice and judicial economy) if class members were 
able to avoid any liability, arising from the unfavorable outcome of 
the class action, by simply lodging an opt out notice.104 
The ALRI concluded that no right to opt out should be available 
in defendant class proceedings, as the opt out procedure places in the 
hands of defendants the power to bring to an end a class action, be-
fore the merits of the plaintiff’s case are considered.  Furthermore, 
this power can be exercised despite the fact that the court has deter-
mined that the defendant class action procedure provides an appro-
priate means of managing the litigation, as the prerequisites for certi-
fication have been met.105  The ALRI also persuasively argued that 
the interests of members of defendant classes may be fully protected, 
without the need to allow them to exclude themselves from the pro-
ceedings, by permitting them to apply (a) for the appointment of ad-
ditional representative defendants and (b) to be added as named de-
fendants.106  But when the Class Proceedings Act, was unveiled in the 
Alberta Legislative Assembly on March 6, 2003,107 the regime govern-
ing defendant class actions, proposed by the ALRI, was conspicu-
ously absent.  In fact, this new regime only authorizes plaintiff class 
actions.  This omission stems from a decision by the Alberta Gov-
ernment to base its class action regime on the Uniform Class Proceed-
ings Act (UCL Act) drafted in 1996 by the Uniform Law Conference 
 
 104. ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 464–467. 
 105. Id. at ¶¶ 464–65. 
 106. Id. at ¶¶ 466–67. 
 107. SA 2003, c C-16.5.  This Act received the Royal Assent on 16 May 2003. 
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of Canada.108  The UCL Act does not authorize defendant class pro-
ceedings. 
The adoption of the UCL model in Alberta is, as far as defen-
dant classes are concerned, incomprehensible.  In fact, the ALRI di-
rectly considered the reasoning that was relied upon to exclude de-
fendant class proceedings from the ambit of the UCL Act and found 
it unpersuasive.109  One of the reasons for the failure of the UCL Act 
to authorize defendant class actions concerned the effect of opt out 
regimes: “unless special rules were inserted denying them the right to 
opt out, in many cases defendant class members would be likely to 
opt out and force the plaintiff to bear the cost of bringing individual 
actions against them.”110  It is difficult to understand why it is prefer-
able to deprive potential litigants and the court system of the poten-
tial benefits associated with such proceedings, instead of creating a 
regime tailored for defendant class actions which, among other things, 
does not envisage opt out rights. 
The approach recommended in the preceding sentence is the ap-
proach followed in the Uniform Class Actions Act 1976 (Uniform 
Act), drafted by the U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws.111  Section 8(d) of the Uniform Act provides that 
members of a defendant class, or of a plaintiff class against whom a 
counterclaim has been asserted, are not permitted to opt out of the 
action.  The rationale for this prohibition is that “if members of a 
class against whom a claim is being asserted were permitted to ex-
clude themselves, it is apparent that many class members would avail 
themselves of the opportunity, and the claimant’s possibility of satis-
faction would be jeopardized.”112 
The states of Iowa, New Hampshire and North Dakota have all 
adopted the Uniform Act.113  In Iowa, for instance, Rule 1.267(4) pro-
 
 108. Alberta Law Reform Institute, Current Projects: Class Actions (2004) (“Our recom-
mendations are based on the prototype of this model contained in the Uniform Class Proceed-
ings Act adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1996.”), at 
http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/crrntproj/classaction.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2005). 
 109. ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 441–54. 
 110. Rogers, supra note 16, at 34. 
 111. See OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 69–70; Michele A. Druker, The Iowa Uniform 
Class Actions Rule: Intended Effect and Probable Results, 66 IOWA L. REV. 1241 (1981); Allen 
D. Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 A.B.A. J. 837 (1977); Ian H. Scher, A Critical View, 63 
A.B.A. J. 840 (1977). 
 112. Vestal, supra note 111, at 839.  But see Scher, supra note 111, at 841. 
 113. IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.267(4); R. SUPER. CT. N.H. 27–A(f); and N.D. R. CIV. P. 23(h)(4). 
See also Holo, supra note 4, at 272 (recommending a new Rule 666(c)(2) for U.S. Federal 
Courts, which “states that no defendant class members may opt out.  This provision simply en-
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vides that “a member of a defendant class may not elect to be ex-
cluded.”  Unfortunately, a different approach has been followed with 
respect to class actions in U.S. federal courts. 
D. Rule 23 of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Certification of a proceeding as a class action in U.S. federal 
courts requires compliance with two “steps.”  First, a class “may sue 
or be sued” under Rule 23 if the proposed class satisfies the four 
threshold requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity—the class must 
be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) 
commonality—there must be questions of law or fact common to the 
class; (3) typicality—the claims or defenses of the representative par-
ties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) ade-
quacy of representation—the representative parties must fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class. 
In addition, plaintiffs must satisfy one of the alternative condi-
tions found in Rule 23(b).  Rule 23(b) creates three different types of 
class actions.  The first type is regulated by Rule 23(b)(1) and deals 
with situations where, in the absence of a class action, separate pro-
ceedings would either establish incompatible standards of conduct for 
the party opposing the class, or would practically prejudice the inter-
ests of class members not made parties.  The second category of class 
actions is regulated by Rule 23(b)(2) and deals with cases where “the 
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class 
as a whole.” 
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions concern cases where common ques-
tions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only indi-
vidual class members and the class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.  Rule 23(b)(3) enumerates four factors to be considered 
in authorizing a class proceeding under that subsection: “(A) the in-
terest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecu-
tion or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
 
sures that defendant class actions will be optimally effective.  By eliminating the risk, however 
small in reality, that defendants will opt out, the rule automatically makes defendant class ac-
tions more efficient.”). 
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concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) 
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 
action.” 
The right to opt out is available to class members only in relation 
to one of the three types of class actions envisaged by Rule 23, 
namely, class actions governed by Rule 23(b)(3).  In relation to class 
actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(c)(2) provides that 
notice must be given to the class members that: (A) the court will ex-
clude him or her if he or she so requests by a specified date; (B) the 
judgment whether favorable or not, will include all members who do 
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request ex-
clusion may, if he or she so desires, enter an appearance through his 
or her counsel.  In relation to the other two categories, notice to class 
members is not mandatory but American courts have, on occasions, 
utilized the wide discretion conferred on them by rule 23(d)(2) to re-
quire that notice be provided to class members. 114 
A number of similarities exist between the way in which Rule 23, 
the Ontario Act and the FC Rules address defendant class actions.  
Rule 23 extends to defendant classes—through the use of phrases and 
words such as “may sue or be sued” and “defenses”—the certification 
regimes and requirements that govern plaintiff class actions and 
which were created for those proceedings.115  Another similarity be-
tween the American and the Canadian approaches may be detected 
upon a review of the report of the advisory committee (U.S. Commit-
tee) that redrafted Rule 23 in 1966.116  No reference to defendant class 
proceedings appears in the U.S. Committee’s notes on Rule 23. This 
 
 114. Rule 23(d)(2) provides that “[i]n the conduct of actions to which this rule applies the 
court may make the appropriate orders . . . requiring, for the protection of the members of the 
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the 
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action or of the proposed ex-
tent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the rep-
resentation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defences, or otherwise to come 
into the action.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2).  As a result of amendments to Rule 23 that came into 
operation in December 2003, Rule 23(c)(2)(A) provides that “for any class certified under Rule 
23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class”. 
 115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  A similar approach was followed by the South African Law 
Commission.  SALC REPORT, supra note 16, ¶ 2.5.7 (noting that “to make our intention clear, 
the draft bill should state that it is possible to institute or defend an action as a class action.”) 
(emphasis in original). See also LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, CONSULTATION 
PAPER ON MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION (CLASS ACTIONS) (LRC CP 25–July 2003) ¶ 4.149 (“The 
Commission believes that a single procedure should generally govern plaintiff and defendant 
class actions alike.”) 
 116. See Advisory Committee Notes to Amendments of Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 94–107 (1966) 
[hereinafter U.S. Committee]. 
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omission has attracted vigorous criticisms from numerous U.S. com-
mentators.117  Consequently, as was the case with the opt out recom-
mendations of the Ontario Committee and the FC Committee, the 
U.S. Committee viewed the issue of class members exiting the pro-
ceedings solely from the perspective of plaintiff classes. The U.S. 
Committee explained the extension of a right to opt out to members 
of Rule 23(b)(3) classes by the following: 
The interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigation may 
be so strong here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether.  
Even when a class action is maintained under subdivision (b)(3), 
this individual interest is respected.118 
The District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Northern 
District of California, respectively, lamented that: 
[u]nfortunately, the committee provides no examples of circum-
stances in which a defendant might be justified in excluding himself 
from a proper class action.  Nor does it discuss the practical impli-
cations of exclusion from a defendant class.119 
It is doubtful the Rule drafters foresaw the lack of practical utility 
of allowing a defendant to “opt out” of a class.120 
Discussion of the regimes governing defendant class proceedings in 
Canada and in the United States, and of the views of the various 
committees upon whose recommendations the regimes were based, 
provides an insight into the difficulties that Canadian and U.S. courts 
have faced in determining the proper approach to the question of ex-
clusion from defendant classes by members of such classes.  These 
courts have been provided with class action regimes that employ opt 
out regimes and have been directed to apply these regimes to all class 
proceedings, regardless of whether the proposed class is suing or is 
being sued. 
Attention will now be turned to: (a) the conceptual and practical 
issues raised by the operation of opt out regimes in defendant class 
 
 117. See, e.g., Holo, supra note 4, at 223 (“[R]ule 23, as applied to defendant class actions, 
has a significant flaw: it contains no provisions specifically prescribing the proper procedures for 
certifying a defendant class.  Rather, the rule simply applies the same provisions to both plaintiff 
and defendant class actions.  However, because the prerequisites and requirements of rule 23 do 
not always apply to defendant class actions, courts are forced to fit potential defendant class ac-
tions into an inappropriate and awkward framework.  Additionally, the framers of rule 23 never 
explained why defendant classes should be subject to the same procedural limitations as plaintiff 
class actions.”). 
 118. U.S. Committee, supra note 116, at 104–05. 
 119. United States v. Trucking Emp., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 693 n.8 (D.D.C. 1977). 
 120. Weinberger v. Jackson, 102 F.R.D. 839, 849 n.17 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
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actions; and (b) the measures devised by Canadian and U.S. courts to 
grapple with these issues. 
IV.  OPTING OUT OF DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS 
A. Potential Problems 
A number of U.S. commentators have pointed out that the certi-
fication of defendant classes, where members of such classes have an 
unfettered right to opt out, constitutes a pointless exercise given that 
most class members can be expected to exit the proceedings.121 It must 
be acknowledged, however, that, in particular circumstances, there 
might exist incentives not to opt out of defendant classes.122  One such 
reason is the possibility and cost of “being individual defendants in 
separate actions or being individual defendants in a single, plaintiffs’ 
class action.”123 
Unfortunately, there is little information available concerning 
the percentage of class members who have opted out of defendant 
class proceedings, after being offered the opportunity to do so follow-
ing the certification of defendant classes.  The author was able to find 
information concerning opt out rates in only four defendant class ac-
tions: three in the United States and one in Ontario.  In the Ontario 
proceeding, no defendant class members opted out.124  In the United 
States, 3 defendants opted out of a class of 91;125 no one exited an-
other defendant class;126 and in a third proceeding, 115 defendants 
opted out.127 
The opting out of defendant classes by a majority of class mem-
bers “undermines the breadth and finality of judgments, increases the 
possibility of duplicative litigation, and lessens the probability of giv-
 
 121. See Taylor, supra note 5, at 81 n.17; Wood, supra note 78, at 609; Ancheta, supra note 5, 
at 306–07; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 635 n.26; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 390; 
Lee, supra note 5, at 67; Theodore Merrill Bailey, Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Im-
proper Method of Litigating Patents? 1971 U. ILL. L. REV. 474, 480 n.49. 
 122. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 5, at 495–96.  See also infra notes 157–160. 
 123. Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20.  See also 
ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, para. 449. 
 124. Chippewas, 29 O.R. 3d at 549, ¶ 772. 
 125. Spencer Williams, Some Defendants Have Class: Reflections on the Gap Securities Liti-
gation, 89 F.R.D. 287, 297 (1980) (discussing defendant class action in In re Gap Stores Sec. 
Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978)). 
 126. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 127. In re Activision Sec. Litig., [1986–87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
92,998, 94,896 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1986). 
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ing plaintiffs full relief.”128  The availability of a right to opt out of a 
defendant class action also has the undesirable effect of generally dis-
couraging the commencement of suits against classes of defendants, 
thereby depriving society of the potential benefits associated with 
such proceedings.  It does not appear unreasonable to submit that one 
of the major reasons for the attempts to seek certification of defen-
dant classes under the Ontario Act in only a handful of cases is an as-
sessment by lawyers acting for plaintiffs that the likelihood of many 
class members opting out would render the certification of defendant 
classes of very little practical benefit.  The tendency of U.S. plaintiff 
attorneys to seek, whenever possible, certification of defendant 
classes under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), so as to avoid Rule 
23(b)(3) and its opt out regime,129 appears to be consistent with this 
assessment of the Ontario regime.130 
The U.S. experience with defendant class proceedings also re-
veals that another significant problem generated by the ability to 
leave a defendant class stems from the privileged status which the 
rules governing the binding effect of class actions confer upon those 
class members who opt out.  The rules in question are referred to in 
 
 128. Williams v. Street Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D. Ill. 1988).  See also 
Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, 214 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Kan. 2003) (“The court be-
lieves that preserving the right of class members to opt out at any time, as allowed by Rule 
23(b)(3), would inhibit efforts to achieve a resolution of the liability issues.”); Broadhollow 
Funding Corp. v. Fitzmaurice (In re Broadhollow Funding Corp.), 66 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“If this action were certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the members of the class 
could ‘opt out’ . . . vitiating the certification process and undermining the chances that this litiga-
tion will resolve the common issue.”); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., No. 82–0983–
CV–W–5, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22022, at *17 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 1984); In re Arthur 
Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
 129. See, e.g., Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1987); Nat’l Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Midland Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 685–86 (D. Kan. 1994); Wil-
liams, 696 F. Supp  at 1576–77; Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 530 (N.D. Ind. 1975).  See also 
Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. 
L. REV. 1008, 1040 (2003) (“Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is understandably rare, since the 
mandatory opt-out provision would shatter maintenance of the class.  Few plaintiffs would seek 
certification under (b)(3) only to have most, if not all, defendants leave the class.”); Holo, supra 
note 4, at 235; Wood, supra note 78, at 608; Bailey, supra note 121, at 480 n.49. 
 130. A number of representative defendants have, instead, expressed a preference for opt 
out defendant classes.  See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Re-
search Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1969).  A 
unique scenario was witnessed in the Chippewas defendant class proceeding in Ontario where 
the defendants were seeking a representation order under Rule 12.7 whilst the plaintiffs were 
seeking certification under the Ontario Act and its opt out regime.  Chippewas, O.R.3d at 566–
67. 
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the U.S. as the doctrine of “non-mutual collateral estoppel.”131  The 
essential features of this doctrine were explained by the OLRC: 
First, the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel permits a per-
son to invoke a decision of the court in a particular case, even 
though he [or she] himself [or herself] was not a party to the earlier 
litigation. Secondly, the doctrine may be invoked only against a 
person who was a party to the earlier litigation and who, it can be 
said, has had “his [or her] day in court”. A party to the earlier liti-
gation cannot rely upon the doctrine to preclude a non-party to that 
litigation from having his [or her] day in court.132 
This doctrine places opt out plaintiffs in a strong position.  In fact, if 
the judgment in the class action goes against the defendant, the for-
mer class members can use this result to win their individual suits, as 
the defendant is prevented from recontesting his or her liability.133  If 
the class judgment is in favor of the defendant, the former class mem-
bers are not bound by this result as the defendant is not allowed to 
invoke the doctrine against them.134  Similar unjust scenarios are gen-
erated by this doctrine in relation to defendant class actions135 as “opt-
 
 131. See generally Garry D. Watson, Duplicative Litigation: Issue Estoppel, Abuse of Process 
and the Death of Mutuality, 69 CAN. BAR REV. 623 (1990); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution 
of the Mass–Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1079–82 
(1986); Kennedy, supra note 70, at 31–33; Douglas J. Gunn, The Offensive Use of Collateral Es-
toppel in Mass Tort Cases, 52 MISS. L.J. 765 (1982); Fisch, supra note 11, at 215; Herbert Sem-
mel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968); 
Wythe W. Holt, Jr., Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629, 
652–53 (1965). 
 132. OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 81–82.  Justice Cumming  of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice noted in Ford v. F. Hoffmann–LaRoche, Ltd., No. 00–CV–200045CP, [2001] 
Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 2012, at *8 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Sept. 14, 2001), that “the court’s power to 
prevent relitigation reaches beyond the limits of the issue estoppel and res judicata doctrine.  
The power is founded on public policy.  The court has power to protect the integrity of its own 
process.” 
 133. “American courts have abandoned the requirement of mutuality and developed ‘offen-
sive non–mutual estoppel’ to estop a defendant from relitigating issues which it lost against an-
other plaintiff.  There, the court has discretion to dispense with the mutuality requirement 
where the party against whom the estoppel is directed has had a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate that same position in an earlier proceeding.  In Canada, the courts have not embraced the 
notion of offensive non-mutual estoppel. They have, however, used their inherent power to pre-
vent an abuse of process.”  Vos v. Hosp. for Sick Children, No. 93–CU–72951A, [1998] Ont. 
Sup. C.J. LEXIS 1460, at *11 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Oct. 28, 1998) (Benotto, J.). 
 134. An example of the practical application of this doctrine was provided by Watson, supra 
note 131, at 631: “[a]ssume P1 sues Airline for negligence in the operation of the aircraft and in 
that action Airline is found to have been negligent.  [The doctrine] . . . permits P2 through P20, 
etc., now to sue Airline and successfully plead issue estoppel on the question of the airline’s neg-
ligence.”  See also Ancheta, supra note 5, at 289–90. 
 135. “Some litigants—those who never appeared in a prior action—may not be collaterally 
estopped without litigating the issue.  They have never had a chance to present their evidence 
and arguments on the claim.  Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing 
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ing out defendants can defensively assert the collateral estoppel doc-
trine against the losing plaintiff if a favourable decision is rendered, 
yet are not bound by an adverse ruling.”136 
To ensure that these unsatisfactory scenarios will not be encoun-
tered in plaintiff class actions brought in the Federal Court of Can-
ada, Rule 299.27(2) provides that “a judgment on common questions 
of law or fact of a class or subclass does not bind a party to the class 
action in any subsequent action between the party and a person who 
opted out or had been excluded from the class action.”137 A similar 
provision, Section 27(2), appears in the Ontario Act.138  Rule 
299.27(2) and Section 27(2) provide another striking illustration of 
the problems created by a failure to consider the effects, on defendant 
class actions, of measures created for plaintiff classes. 
While the Canadian provisions mentioned above are effective to 
ensure that a doctrine similar to the U.S. non-mutual collateral estop-
pel is not applicable to plaintiff class actions, they have the opposite 
effect in relation to defendant class actions.  In fact, Rule 299.27(2) 
and Section 27(2) enable Canadian defendant class members who opt 
out to enjoy some of the privileges that are available to opt out de-
fendants in the United States.  This is because they are able to avoid 
the unfavorable outcome of the defendant class proceeding, in any 
subsequent litigation initiated against such opt out defendants by any 
 
adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position.  Also, the au-
thorities have been . . . willing to permit a defendant in a second suit to invoke an estoppel 
against a plaintiff who lost on the same claim in an earlier suit . . . .” Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. 
v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (citation omitted).  See also Lee, supra note 5, at 
52. 
 136. Max, supra note 5, at 455 n.16.  See also In re Yarn Processing Patent Litig., 56 F.R.D. 
648, 654 (S.D. Fla. 1972).  To address these problems an American commentator has suggested 
that those defendant class members who opt out should not be allowed to assert collateral es-
toppel in the event the plaintiff loses the class action.  HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 635.  
One court has rejected this proposal on the basis that “such a limitation is beyond the power of 
the certifying court.” In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 306 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
 137. “[A]s a matter of principle, a member should not be allowed to opt out, sit on the side-
lines, and then foreclose the defendant from asserting a defence by invoking a judgment in a 
proceeding in which that member did not wish to participate.”  FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 
72.  See also SALC REPORT, supra note 16, at ¶ 5.11.7 (noting that this type of provision pre-
vents “a class member from opting out of a class proceeding and then, at some later date, bene-
fiting from a judgment on the common issues”). 
 138. Section 27(2) of the Ontario Act provides that a judgment on common issues of a class 
or subclass does not bind a party to the class proceeding in any subsequent proceeding between 
the party and a person who has opted out of the class proceeding.  As was pointed out by Justice 
Keenan of the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), “the language of section 27 is simi-
lar to that recommended [by the OLRC].”  Allan v. CIBC Trust Corp., Nos. 96–CU–106129, 96–
CU–111026, [1998] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 44, at *14 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just. Mar. 21, 1998). 
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of the opponents of the defendant classes.  In fact, as noted above, the 
FC Rules and the Ontario Act expressly provide that the class pro-
ceedings do not bind the parties to the class proceedings in any sub-
sequent proceedings involving the opt out class members.  But, fortu-
nately, unlike their U.S. counterparts,139 opt out defendants are not 
able to rely on prior determinations against the plaintiffs in the class 
suit, by invoking collateral estoppel defensively, as such determina-
tions are not binding on the plaintiffs and the opt out defendants in 
any subsequent litigation between them. 
B. No Restrictions on the Opt Out Rights of Defendants 
In light of the potential adverse effects of opt out regimes in de-
fendant class actions, an obvious question is whether courts have 
been prepared to imply any restrictions on the ability of defendant 
class members to leave the proceedings.  In Ontario, courts have not 
been prepared to impose any such restrictions.  Two major lines of 
reasoning have been formulated to support this judicial conclusion.140  
First, reliance has been placed on the fact that the provision govern-
ing opt outs under Section 9 of the Ontario Act does not expressly 
formulate any restrictions.  A second factor relied upon by Ontario 
courts to decline the imposition of any prohibitions or restrictions on 
opt out rights in defendant class actions is that the Ontario legislature, 
acting pursuant to the Ontario Committee’s recommendations, did 
not implement the OLRC’s recommendation that courts should, in 
their discretion, be able to prevent some or all of the class members 
from opting out.141 
In the United States, most courts have acted on the premise that 
the right to opt out of Rule 23(b)(3) classes is unfettered, regardless 
of whether a class is sued or is suing.142  In Northwestern National 
 
 139. “Members of a class can receive the benefit of prior determinations against the plain-
tiff—whether or not they were parties to those actions—by invoking collateral estoppel defen-
sively.”  Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, Kan., No. 01–2303–CM, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25144, at *14 n.18 (D. Kan. Dec. 2, 2002). 
 140. See Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *17–18 
(Ont. Sup. Ct. Just. Mar. 13, 2001) (Cumming, J.). 
 141. OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 491. 
 142. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 112 F.R.D. 52, 57 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1986) (“There is nothing in the rule to indicate that the opt–out provision is not as appli-
cable to members of a defendant class as it is to members of a plaintiff’s class.”).  Cf. Kline v. 
Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238–39 (Duniway, J., concurring).  In 1985, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that “due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided 
with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or 
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Bank of Minneapolis v. Fox & Co., for instance, the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s request that opt out requests lodged by defendant class 
members should not be accepted unless they “are submitted in good 
faith for the purpose of appearing individually through separately re-
tained counsel.”143  The court held that the class members’ “absolute 
right to ‘opt out’ should not be burdened with difficult considerations, 
simply because it is in the plaintiffs’ best interests to have all [class 
members] included in the class.”144 
C. Judicial Responses to the Problems Created by Opt Out Regimes 
in Defendant Classes 
As was indicated in Part II above, in Chippewas the court ruled 
that in the event of most defendants opting out of a class, the litiga-
tion may be conducted as a representative proceeding.145  An obvious 
problem with this approach is that it deprives litigants and the courts 
of the detailed guidance provided by the Ontario Act as to the proce-
dures that are to be implemented at every stage of the proceedings.146 
In Berry v. Pulley, Judge Cumming of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice was faced with the submission of the defendants 
claiming that there should be no certification of the defendant class 
given that most of the defendant class members would opt out.  Judge 
Cumming was of the view that it was apparent that individual defen-
dants would achieve significant economy in respect of costs by re-
maining in the class action instead of becoming individual defendants 
in a separate plaintiff class action proposed to be brought by the 
 
‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 
(1985). 
 143. N.W. Nat’l. Bank of Minneapolis v. Fox & Co., 102 F.R.D. 507, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 144. Id.  It is interesting to note, however, that in Hammond v. Hendrickson, No. 85 C 
09829, 1990 US Dist. LEXIS 11071, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 1990), the representative defendant 
was “estopped from recommending to class members that they opt out of the class” whilst in In 
re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 528, 536 (S.D. Fla. 1986), the Court indicated that it 
“would be reluctant to permit [defendant class members] choosing to opt–out the ability to rely 
on [the representative defendant’s] counsel and thus, individual representation will be re-
quired.” 
 145. See text accompanying notes 54–56. 
 146. Justice Adams himself acknowledged the superiority of the Ontario Act vis–à–vis Rule 
12.7: “[I]t seems preferable to at least first use the [Ontario Act] with its available procedures 
and policy balances, if at all possible.  Because of the great uncertainty which can arise in the 
administration of proceedings involving a multiplicity of parties, a court should prefer the most 
comprehensive regulatory regime reasonably available to it.  This approach will promote econ-
omy, efficiency and expedition.  These goals are of interest to all affected parties and the public 
at large.”  Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] O.R.3d 549, 568 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.). 
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plaintiffs against each defendant.147  Judge Cumming also drew atten-
tion to the availability of the following strategies for dealing with 
those class members who choose to opt out: 
Plaintiffs might seek an order under rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 . . . that the action to be initiated 
against individual defendants be consolidated or heard at the same 
time as the class action at hand.  Alternatively, the plaintiffs might 
seek a joinder of the [defendants] in the new action who have opted 
out of the class action at hand upon a certification, as necessary 
parties to the action at hand under rules 5.03(1), (4) and (5).  The 
underlying principle is that everyone concerned with the same is-
sues be before the court at one hearing, unless this results in preju-
dice to any of the parties.148 
It is submitted, however, that Judge Cumming’s strategy is flawed, as 
it seeks to rely on procedures for dealing with group litigation (such 
as individual proceedings followed by joinder or consolidation) which 
have been found wanting, and which have resulted in the creation of 
representative proceedings, at first, and class actions, more recently.149 
The approach of U.S. courts to the ability of defendant class 
members to opt out may be divided into five broad categories.  A 
number of courts have certified defendant classes under Rule 
23(b)(3) without discussion of the potential problems generated by 
the availability of the right to opt out.150  In another series of cases, 
courts have denied certification of defendant classes under Rule 
23(b)(3) on the basis of other reasons and factors but then added that, 
 
 147. Berry v. Pulley, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20. 
 148. Id. at *21–22. 
 149. “The fact is that class actions of a restricted kind have been known to our law for many 
years because they have had to be invented as ad hoc expedients to deal with the lacunae in the 
present law.” LRCSA REPORT, supra note 18, at 5.  See also VINCE MORABITO & JUDD 
EPSTEIN, VICTORIAN ATTORNEY–GENERAL’S LAW REFORM ADVISORY COUNCIL, CLASS 
ACTIONS IN VICTORIA: TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH ¶¶ 5.12–5.18, 6.4–6.6 (1997); LORD 
HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 224–25 (Stationary Office Books Pub., 1996); 
Charles, supra note 28, at 30; ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, paras. 46–58; OLRC REPORT, su-
pra note 5, ch. 3; Dolgow v. Anderson 43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (explaining the ad-
vantages of “class action in affording relief”); Tilbury, supra note 28, at 6; MLRC REPORT,  su-
pra note 9, at 9–13 (calling current Manitoba rules on multi–party proceedings an inadequate 
“patchwork”). 
 150. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 528, 536 (S.D. Fla. 1986); In re 
Computer Memories Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 675, 689 (N.D. Cal. 1986); In re Victor Techs. Sec. 
Litig., 102 F.R.D. 53, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Osborn v. Pa.-Del. Serv. Station Dealers Ass’n, 94 
F.R.D. 23, 26 (D. Del 1981); Dudley v. S.E. Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 180 (N.D. Ga. 
1972); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Ferguson v. Williams, 
330 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (N.D. Miss. 1971); N. Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 
635–36 (D. Kan. 1968).  See also Kruger & Rogers, supra note 11, at 856 n.92. 
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in any event, the ability of defendants to opt out would render reli-
ance on Rule 23(b)(3) inappropriate.151 
A third judicial approach in the United States has been to certify 
defendant classes under either Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), de-
spite a finding that the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) had also been 
met.152  It is crucial to note that, in doing so, courts have followed a 
number of authorities dealing with plaintiff classes.153  Some of the un-
favorable effects created by the exiting of plaintiff class members 
from the litigation were succinctly explained by the OLRC: 
To the extent that class members exercised their right to exclude 
themselves from the class for the purpose of prosecuting their indi-
vidual suits, the desired economies would suffer and the possibility 
of inconsistent judicial holdings would increase.154 
 
 151. See, e.g., Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., No. 17653, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13294, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 1970) (“With the ‘opt out’ requirement of (3), little or nothing could 
be gained even if it was otherwise applicable.”). See also In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee 
Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Benzoni v. Greve, 54 F.R.D. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972).  It is interesting to note that in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Mid-
land Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 685 (D. Kan. 1994), the Court indicated that even the repre-
sentative defendants would opt out! 
 152. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701, 706 (N.D.N.Y. 
1980) (“[I]n defendant class actions, it is preferable and perhaps even necessary to certify a class 
under either (b)(1) or (b)(2) rather than (b)(3), to avoid the possibility of defendant class mem-
bers opting out of the class as is allowed under (b)(3).”).  See also First Fed. of Mich. v. Barrow, 
878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989); Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, 214 F.R.D. 656, 664 
(D. Kan. 2003); Tilley v. TJX Cos., 212 F.R.D. 43, 47 (D. Mass. 2003); Williams v. State Bd. of 
Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp., 112 F.R.D. 52, 58 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Broadhollow Funding Corp. v. Fitzmaurice (In 
re Broadhollow Funding Corp.), 66 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. 
Conservation Chem. Co., No. 82–0983–CV–W–5, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22022, at *17 (W.D. 
Miss. Nov. 14, 1984); In re Alexander Grant & Co., 110 F.R.D. at 538; Bailey, supra note 121, at 
490–91; Wolfson, surpa note 5, at 494. 
 153. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Nat’l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 284 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing 
multiple authorities); Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 556 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(same); Green v. Occidental Petro. Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976) (relying on 
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE); Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 
50 F.R.D. 295, 300–01 (E.D. La. 1970) (relying on 1966 Advisory Committee’s Notes); Mungin 
v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (relying on MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969) (same); 
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (relying on 1966 Advisory 
Committee Notes). 
 154. OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 471. This is one of the reasons why a number of com-
mentators have recommended that class members be required to obtain the approval of the 
court before they may be permitted to opt out. See generally Mark W. Friedman, Constrained 
Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class Members to make a Good Cause Showing 
before Opting out of a Federal Class Action, 100 YALE L.J. 745 (1990) (advocating that the opt 
out provision of Rule 23 be revised so as to make the choice available only upon a showing of 
good cause).  A far more extreme proposal, involving mandatory-litigation (no exit and no opt 
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An additional unsatisfactory dimension exists in defendant class ac-
tions as the right to opt out enables class members to avoid litigation 
in a way in which is not available to defendants in traditional litiga-
tion. As was perceptively noted by the District Court for the District 
of Columbia: 
Defendants, unlike plaintiffs, are ordinarily involuntary participants 
in a lawsuit. To provide them the wherewithal to frustrate a suit 
that is properly certifiable as a class action simply by refusing to 
participate in it—by opting out—would be anomalous. Indeed, to 
enable defendants to defeat the “class” aspect of the action would 
enfeeble an otherwise potent means for remedying at once wide-
spread civil-rights violations and other unlawful conduct.155 
A fourth strategy has been followed by a majority of U.S. courts. 
They have assessed the circumstances of the class proceedings before 
them to determine the likelihood of certification of a defendant class 
under Rule 23(b)(3) being thwarted by the departure of many class 
members.  Where the court makes such a finding, no Rule 23(b)(3) 
certification of a defendant class takes place.156  A judicial assessment 
that a mass exit from the proceedings is unlikely results in a Rule 
23(b)(3) certification order,157 sometimes with the proviso that if the 
court’s assessment later proves to be incorrect, a decertification or-
der,158 or an order modifying the class,159 will be considered by the 
court. 
 
out) class actions for adjudicating mass tort cases, was put forward by Professor Rosenberg. See 
David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002). 
 155. United States v. Trucking Emp., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 693 (D.D.C. 1977). 
 156. See, e.g., Clark v. McDonald’s Corp., CV 02–0247 (RBK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3178, 
at *85–*86 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2003); Heffler v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., No. 90–7126, 1992 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090, at *15–16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1992); In re Broadhollow, 66 B.R. at 1013; 
Flying Tiger Line Inc. v. Cent. States, S.W. & S.E. Areas Pension Fund, No. 86–304 CMW, 1986 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409, at *15 n.10 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 1986); Employers Ins., 112 F.R.D. at 58; 
In re Arthur Treacher’s, 93 F.R.D. at 595–96. 
 157. See, e.g., Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20–
21 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Mar. 13, 2001); Sebo v. Rubenstein, 188 F.R.D. 310, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1999); 
Endo v Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 171–72 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Alvarado Ptnrs., L.P. v. Mehta, 130 
F.R.D. 673, 675 (D.  Colo. 1990); In re Alexander Grant & Co., 110 F.R.D. at 536; Hammond v. 
Hendrickson, No. 85 C 9829, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22198, at *34 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1986); In re 
LILCO Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 673–74 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); N.W. Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. 
Fox & Co., 102 F.R.D. 507, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n of 
Ill., 97 F.R.D. 668, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 306 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978). 
 158. See, e.g., Alvarado Ptnrs., 130 F.R.D. at 675. 
 159. See, e.g., Sebo, 188 F.R.D. at 319. 
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Where a judicial finding is made that it would not be in the best 
interests of defendant class members to opt out, significant reliance is 
usually placed on: (a) the fact that the plaintiffs have already com-
menced individual proceedings against some of the class members; or 
(b) a judicial assessment that the plaintiffs will not hesitate to take 
such a measure against those who leave the class.160  This judicial em-
phasis on individual proceedings creates a strong incentive, for those 
wishing to seek certification of a defendant class under Rule 23(b)(3), 
to commence, in conjunction with the filing of a Rule 23 proceeding, 
individual proceedings against most of the members of the putative 
defendant class.  But the avoidance of this unfavorable scenario—that 
is, of the same adversaries being embroiled in individual and group 
litigation contemporaneously with respect to the same dispute—is 
precisely why the commencement of a class proceeding, under Rule 
23 and under most of the Canadian and Australian class action re-
gimes, has the effect of suspending the operation of statutes of limita-
tions for every member of plaintiff classes161 and not just the named 
plaintiffs.162 
 
 160. See, e.g., Sebo, 188 F.R.D. at 319; In re LILCO, 111 F.R.D. at 674; In re Alexander 
Grant & Co., 110 F.R.D. at 536; N.W. Nat’l Bank, 102 F.R.D. at 515; Weinberger, 102 F.R.D. at 
849; Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 682; In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 305–06; Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. 
C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20–21; Simpson & Perra, supra note 11, 1332; Williams, supra note 125, at 
290; Wolfson, supra  note 5, at 496.  But see Clark, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3178, at *85; In re Ar-
thur Treacher’s, 93 F.R.D. at 595–96. 
 161. See Alberta Act, § 40; Manitoba Act, § 39; NL Act, § 39; Saskatchewan Act, § 43; BC 
Act, § 39; Ontario Act, § 28; Pt. IVA, § 33ZE; and Pt. 4A, § 33ZE.  See also Note, Statutes of 
Limitations and Defendant Class Actions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 347, 347–48 (1983) [hereinafter 
MICHIGAN Note] (“The Federal Rules do not indicate when the statute of limitations is tolled as 
to absent, unnamed members of the class.”); In re Activision Sec. Litig., [1986–1987 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,998, at 94,897 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1986) (“The Supreme 
Court has held . . . that ‘the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of 
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit  
been permitted to continue as a class action.’”) (quoting Am. Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 
U.S. 538, 554 (1974)).  See also Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 
(1983). The tolling rule applies to all asserted class members, not just those who seek to inter-
vene, id. at 350, and applies regardless of whether class certification ultimately is granted or de-
nied.  See Tosti v, City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d. 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985).  See generally Kath-
leen Cerveny, Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied: Chardon v. Fumero Soto and 
Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686 (1985); William Jonason, Note, The Ameri-
can Pipe Dream: Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations,  67 IOWA L. REV. 743 (1982). 
 162. The rationale for this suspension has been described as follows by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the OLRC, respectively: “Otherwise, all class members would be forced to intervene 
to preserve their claims, and one of the major goals of class action litigation—to simplify litiga-
tion involving a large number of class members with similar claims—would be defeated,”  Dev-
lin v. Scardeletti, 122 S. Ct. 2005, 2010–11 (2002); and “[i]t is also apparent that [not suspending 
limitation periods] would militate against the policy of increased access to the courts and the 
vindication of small claims. It would be uneconomical for absent class members with individu-
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A fifth judicial approach in the United States may also be de-
tected.  A number of U.S. courts have not regarded the certification 
of opt out defendant classes as an evil to be avoided whenever possi-
ble.  On the contrary, they have preferred certification of defendant 
classes under Rule 23(b)(3) precisely, or partly, because of the right 
of class members to opt out.163  This stance is based on the belief that 
“[d]efendant class actions embody a potential for unfairness to absent 
class members”164 and that allowing class members to opt out consti-
tutes an effective means of addressing such unfairness.165 
D. Potential Unfairness of Defendant Class Proceedings 
Three major reasons have been put forward by courts for their 
“concern that the very concept of defendant classes may violate due 
process.”166  The first reason is that, unlike representative plaintiffs, 
 
ally nonrecoverable claims to incur the expense of filing precautionary motions to intervene . . .” 
OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 779––80.  See also Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 352–53; 
ONTARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 87 at 47; LRCSA REPORT, supra note 18, at 10; ALRI 
REPORT, supra note 5, ¶¶ 415–16.  See also Logan v. Canada, No. 99–CV–181819 CP, [2002] 
Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 257, at *3–4 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Feb. 13, 2002) (Winkler, J.) (“[T]o permit 
a litigant to maintain their individual action . . . while at the same time acting as a representative 
plaintiff in a class proceeding in respect of the same issues appears, prima facie, to be inimical to 
the objects of the [Ontario Act], and in particular to the stated goal of judicial economy or liti-
gation efficiency.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers of Am., 220 F.3d 
814, 820 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Seagate Tech. Sec. Litig., 115 F.R.D. 264, 273 (N.D. Cal. 1987); 
Hammond v. Hendrickson, No. 85 C 9829, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22198, at *33 (N.D. Ill. July 
28, 1986); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Thillens, Inc. v. 
Comty. Currency Ass’n of Ill., 97 F.R.D. 668, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 
529 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (opt out right would allow defendant class members to “protect themselves 
against possible inadequate representation of their particular . . . defenses”); Technograph 
Printed Circuits v. Methode Elec., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
 164. Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 244 (5th Cir. 1984).  See also Payton v. County of Kane, 
308 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting defendant classes should be created with care); Coali-
tion for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 72 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1096, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1996); 
Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan  Ass’n (In re Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 105 B.R. 
834, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); 
DeAllaume v. Perales, 110 F.R.D. 299, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Akerman v. Oryx Communica-
tions, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 674; Adashunas v. 
Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1980); Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 81 F.R.D. 487, 
489 (W.D. Pa. 1979); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 292 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (notice to 
defendants is a prerequisite for fundamental fairness). 
 165. “[T]here is a potential problem with virtually all defendant classes that proceed under 
anything but Rule 23(b)(3).  Defendant classes, initiated by those opposed to the interests of the 
class, are more likely than plaintiff classes to include members whose interests diverge from 
those of the named representatives, which means they are more in need of the due process pro-
tections afforded by (b)(3)’s safeguards.”  Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 820. 
 166. Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 108 F.R.D. 107, 111 (C.D. Ill. 1985). 
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“named defendants in a class action rarely succumb to their roles as 
class representatives without protest”167 and courts “fear that an un-
willing representative will necessarily be a poor one.”168  A second 
perceived problem with defendant class actions relates to the fact that 
it is usually the plaintiff who moves for certification of a defendant 
class and who nominates the representatives of the defendant class.169  
This state of affairs provoked the following response in 1950 from 
Professor Zechariah Chafee, which has since been quoted by several 
U.S. courts:170 
It is a strange situation where one side picks out the generals for 
the enemy’s army.  When A is suing a class, he naturally wants the 
class to lose.  At best, he is not fit to make a disinterested and well-
informed selection among his opponents.  At worst, he has strong 
motives for choosing straw men and incompetents, who will lie 
down before his projected attack.171 
The third reason that has been put forward by courts in the United 
States, for their fear that defendant class actions might generate un-
fair scenarios for class members, has been described as follows by the 
District Court for the Central District of Illinois: 
Another due process problem is that an unnamed member of a 
plaintiff class stands to lose only the right to later bring the same 
cause of action.  In contrast, an unnamed member of a defendant 
class may be required to pay a judgment without having had the 
opportunity to personally defend the suit.172 
 
 167. Marcera v. Chinlund, 91 F.R.D. 579, 584 n.10.  See also In re Cardinal Indus., 105 B.R. 
at 844; Broadhollow Funding Corp. v. Fitzmaurice (In re Broadhollow Funding Corp.), 66 B.R. 
1005, 1011 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80 C 2642, 
1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Lilly, supra note 129, at 1039; 
HARVARD Note, supra note 5,  at 648. 
 168. In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 290.  See also COLUMBIA Note, supra note 11, at 828–29. 
 169. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1239 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[N]amed defendants almost 
never choose their role as class champion—it is a potentially onerous one thrust upon them by 
their opponents.”).  See also Baker, 743 F.2d at 244; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 382; 
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 696 n.39. 
 170. See, e.g., In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
 171. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 237–38 (1950).  See also 
VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 382; C.A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 173 (1969); 
Lee, supra note 5, at 60; Note, Denial of Due Process Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEX. 
L. REV. 64, 67 (1946) (hereinafter TEXAS Note). 
 172. Henson, 108 F.R.D. at 111–12.  See also Monument Builders of Pa. v. Am. Cemetery 
Ass’n, 206 F.R.D. 113, 119 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Heffler v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., No. 90–
7126, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1992); Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. 
Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 374–
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Thillens v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n, 97 F.R.D. 668, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1983); 
In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” I.U.D. Prods. Liability Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 907 n.82 
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These three arguments will now be explored in more detail.  With re-
spect to the initiation of defendant class actions, it is crucial to note 
that there is nothing to prevent defendants from seeking certification 
of defendant classes and their appointment as representatives of such 
classes.173  Indeed, the Ontario Act and the FC Rules expressly refer 
to any party being able to initiate the process leading to the certifica-
tion of defendant class proceedings.  But a more significant point is 
that, as highlighted by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, “the party who 
seeks to utilize a class action must establish his right to do so, ‘even if 
the class sought to be created is a defendant class’”174—essentially 
convincing the court that the prerequisites for certification have been 
satisfied.175  Indeed, most U.S. courts have regarded themselves as be-
ing under an obligation to “‘carefully examine the impact of [class] 
certification on the rights of unnamed class members’ before desig-
nating a defendant class.”176 
In relation to the Canadian class action regimes, as was noted by 
the ALRI, once a certification order has been granted by the court, 
 
(N.D. Cal. 1981); Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 81 F.R.D. 487, 489 (W.D. Pa. 1979); In re 
Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 290–91; Lilly, supra note 129, at 1043–44. 
 173. See, e.g., Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at 659; S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 
2 F.3d 1023, 1030 (10th Cir. 1993); Weinberger v. Brokers Mortgage Servs. Inc., No. 84 Civ. 6847 
(RLC), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14633, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1985); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 625 
F. Supp. 1212, 1222–23 (N.D. Ill. 1985); VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 382 n.92. 
 174. Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 180 (1981) (quoting Life of the 
Land v. Burns, 59 Haw. 244, 253 (1978)).  See also Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at 659; Doe v. 
Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 465 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Midland 
Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 685 (D. Kan. 1994); Heffler, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090, at *8–9; 
Kohn v. Mucia, 776 F. Supp. 348, 352 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Alexander Grant & Co. v. McAlister, 116 
F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 110 F.R.D. 
576, 580 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Ragsdale, 625 F. Supp. at 1219; Klein v. Coun. of Chem. Ass’ns, 587 
F. Supp. 213, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Stewart v. Winter, 87 F.R.D. 760, 768 (N.D. Miss. 1980); 
Tucker v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 499 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
 175. In the United States, the “typicality” requirement has been regarded as a significant 
requirement for defendant classes.  See, e.g., Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80 
C 2642, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Mudd v. Busse, 68 
F.R.D. 522, 529 (N.D. Ind. 1975). It has been held that “[t]he defenses raised by the class repre-
sentative need not be identical to those raised by other class members, and it is only when there 
is a unique defense forwarded by the representative which will consume the merits of the case 
that a court should refuse to certify a class based on a lack of typicality.”  Alexander Grant, 116 
F.R.D. at 588.  See also Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Thillens, 97 F.R.D. 
at 678; Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1239 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Trucking Em-
ployers, 75 F.R.D. 682, 688 (D. Col. 1977). 
 176. Follette, 658 F. Supp. at 507 (quoting Akerman, 609 F. Supp. at 375).  See also Adashu-
nas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604–05 (7th Cir. 1980); Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 674; Marchwinski, 81 
F.R.D. at 489. 
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[i]t must . . . be supposed, since it is a criterion for certification, that 
the court has concluded that a defendant class action is the prefer-
able procedure for the fair and efficient resolution of the common 
issues. Therefore, we do not see why members of the defendant 
class should be allowed to opt out of what has been determined to 
be the fair and efficient procedure for resolving the common is-
sues.177 
The most important of the certification requirements, in both Canada 
and the United States, is that the representative party would fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the class.178  Several U.S. 
courts have required that this directive be strictly observed in defen-
dant class proceedings.179  Furthermore, it has been noted that “the 
Court has a great deal of latitude and discretion in selecting class rep-
resentatives whom it believes will provide the necessary protec-
tion . . . .”180  American and Ontario courts have repeatedly displayed 
an unwillingness to simply accept, as adequate representatives, the 
named defendants nominated by the plaintiffs.  In fact, on several oc-
casions courts have concluded that all, or at least some, of the repre-
sentative defendants proposed by the plaintiffs would be unlikely to 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.181  When such a 
 
 177. ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 465. 
 178. See Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 214 F.R.D. 465, 470–71 & n.15 (S.D. Tex. 2002); In 
re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Arthur 
Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Institutionalized Juveniles v. 
Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 78 F.R.D. 413, 414 (E.D. Pa. 1978).  See also VALPARAISO Note, supra 
note 5, at 378–79; W. Van Dercreek, The ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ of Class Actions under Federal Rule 
23, 48 IOWA L. REV. 273, 278 (1962). 
 179. See, e.g., Ragsdale, 625 F. Supp. at 1223–24.  In this regard, Chafee has written the fol-
lowing: 
[T]he court ought to scrutinize the selected representatives of the defendant class with 
the greatest care and arrange for changes and additions if there is the slightest reason 
to suspect incompetence or the absence of the will to fight. The judge ought to regard 
the unnamed members of the sued class as wards of the court for the time being. 
CHAFEE, supra note 171, at 238.  See also City of Excelsior Springs v. Elms Redevelopment 
Corp., 18 S.W.3d 53, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Leon H. Weiner & Assoc., Inc. v. Krapf, 584 A.2d 
1220, 1224 (Del. 1991); Lee, supra note 5, at 60.  With respect to representative proceedings, see 
Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853) (“care must be taken that persons are brought on 
the record fairly representing the interest or right involved”). 
 180. Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701, 705 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).  See 
also Doe v. Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 467 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (“[T]he Court has within its power the 
ability to replace class representatives with other class members or to increase the number of 
class representatives.”); Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50, 65 n.12 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Itel Sec. 
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Gross, supra note 5, at 643. 
 181. See, e.g., Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 913–14 (9th Cir. 1981); Greenhouse v. Greco, 
617 F.2d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 1980); Adashunas, 626 F.2d at 605; Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. 
Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Local 1804–1, No. 90 
Civ. 0963 (LBS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15083, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1993); Amnesty Am. 
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finding is made, one of the following four scenarios will usually fol-
low: (a) the plaintiff’s motion for certification will be denied;182 (b) the 
plaintiff will be asked to nominate alternative defendants;183 (c) the 
putative class members will be asked to choose their representative;184 
or (d) the court will appoint sua sponte alternative or additional rep-
resentatives.185 
Courts have also been willing to appoint defendant representa-
tives on a provisional basis only.186  They have also, wisely in the au-
thor’s view, generally preferred to appoint multiple defendants.187  As 
was explained by Judge Adams of the Ontario Superior Court of Jus-
tice, “[m]ultiple defendants are appropriate in order to share the bur-
den of the defence and to provide confidence to the wide range of 
members of the class to be defended.”188  A related measure has been 
 
v. County of Allegheny, 822 F. Supp. 297, 300 (W.D. Pa. 1993); Vargas v. Calabrase, 634 F. 
Supp. 910, 921 (D.N.J. 1986); Rodriquez v. Twp. of De Kalb, No. 80 C 1509, 1984 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22302, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1984); Nat’l Ass’n for Mental Health, Inc. v. Califano, 
717 F.2d 1451, 1458–59 (D. Col. 1983); Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, 516 F. Supp. 
1345, 1353 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 395 (D. Mass. 1979); Cana-
dian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, 97 F.R.D. 453, 458; In re Gap Stores, 79 
F.R.D. at 303; Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 422–23 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Benzoni v. Greve, 54 
F.R.D. 450, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 359, 363–64 
(W.D.N.Y. 1972); Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) 574, 576; Land 
Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. at 184;.  Similarly, lack of adequate representation results in denial of a 
representation order.  See, e.g., Walker v. Sur, [1914] 2 K.B. 930, 934; Metallic Roofing Co. of 
Canada v. Local Union No. 30, [1905] 9 O.L.R. 171, 179. 
 182. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Mental Health, 717 F.2d at 1458–59; Blake, 663 F.2d at 913–14; 
Adashunas, 626 F.2d at 605; Greenhouse, 617 F.2d at 412–13; Ellis v. O’Hara, 105 F.R.D. 556, 
564 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Rodriquez, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22302, at *24; Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 
at 395; Amnesty Am., 822 F. Supp. at 300; Vargas, 634 F. Supp. at 921; Mason, 360 F. Supp at 
422–23; Benzoni, 54 F.R.D. at 454–55; Coniglio, 60 F.R.D. at  363–64; Joseph L., 516 F. Supp. at 
1353; Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. at 184–85;. 
 183. See, e.g., Monaco, 187 F.R.D. at 65–66; Local 1804–1, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15083, at 
*5–6; Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 
181, 194 (E.D. Va. 1970). 
 184. See, e.g., Miller, 216 F.R.D. at 467; Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 
1578 (N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 615 (E.D. 1985). 
 185. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 186. See, e.g., Alexander Grant, 116 F.R.D. at 589; In re Consumers, 105 F.R.D. at 615. 
 187. See, e.g., Weinman v. Fidelity Capital Appreciation Fund, 262 F.3d 1089, 1096 (10th 
Cir. 2001); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 132 (7th Cir. 
1974); Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Rockie Ratcliff, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798, at *18 (D. Kan. 
Sept. 20, 1996); Webcraft Tech., Inc. v. Alden Press, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182, 185 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 9, 1985); Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 683; Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D at 685; United States v. 
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, 71 F.R.D. 10, 16 (D. Nev. 1975); ; Technograph Printed Cir., 
Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–
CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *25 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Mar. 13, 2001);. 
 188. Chippewas, [1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) at 575.  See also Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Can-
ada, [2000] Carswell Ont. 1894, at ¶ 19 (“[I]t was reasonable for the separate defendants to be 
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the creation of subclasses to deal with any potential intraclass con-
flicts or differences between the circumstances of the class mem-
bers.189  In Berry, for instance, Judge Cumming of the Ontario Supe-
rior Court of Justice divided a defendant class into seven subclasses, 
with different persons representing each subclass.190  The court man-
aging a defendant class action also possesses the power to decertify 
the proceedings if it later transpires that the reasons for granting cer-
tification either no longer exist or never existed.191 
Another important safeguard is provided by the fact that class 
members have the right to appear before the court to challenge the 
class representative; to be joined as a named defendant or to “present 
to the Court any defenses inadequately presented or not already pre-
sented.”192  Section 14 of the Ontario Act and Rule 299.25(1) of the 
FC Rules expressly authorize courts presiding over class proceedings 
to permit class members to participate in the proceeding.  As was ex-
plained by the Court of Appeal for Ontario: 
 
separately represented.”); In re Broadhollow Funding Corp, 66 B.R. 1005, 1010 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[A] variety of defendant class representatives enhances the probability of 
typicality of defenses being present.”).  With respect to representative proceedings, see National 
Supply Company, Ltd. v. Greenback, [1941] 3 W.W.R. 711, 715 (“[I]f, however, it should appear 
before or during the trial that some one in addition to Greenbank should be appointed to press 
any grounds of defence in addition to those open to the majority of whom Greenbank is one, a 
further representation order may be made.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Ontario Act § (2); FC Rules, Rule 299.19(2); Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1106; In re 
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764, 778 (2d Cir. 1986); Alexander Grant, 116 F.R.D. 
at 591; In re Broadhollow, 66 B.R. at 1010; Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 29 
O.R.3d 549, 566; Ancheta, supra note 5, at 294; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 641; Wolfson, 
supra note 5, at 481. With respect to representative proceedings, see Bromley (1863) 32 Beav 
177, 188 (Romilly, MR) (stating “but if there be three or four classes who have separate and 
conflicting interests, then you may select two or three from each class to represent that interest, 
in the same way as if the whole class had been brought before the Court”). 
 190. Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *8. 
 191. See Ontario Act § 10; FC Rules, Rule 299.21; Monaco, 187 F.R.D. at 59; Alvarado 
Ptnrs., L.P. v. Mehta, 130 F.R.D. 673, 676 (D. Colo. 1990); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 90 
F.R.D. 589, 591 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 113; Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. 
LEXIS 499, at *13. 
 192. Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 137 (M.D. Ala. 1984).  See also Kerney v. Fort 
Griffin Fandangle Ass’n, Inc., 624 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at 
664; Webcraft, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 185–86; United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 
294, 299 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Gross, supra note 5, at 643–44, 651–52; Max, supra note 5, at 454 n.10; 
HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 637 n.40; Ancheta, supra note 5, at 299; Wolfson, supra note 5, 
at 466, 482, 492. With respect to representative proceedings, see Commissioners of Sewers v. 
Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610, 617 (1876) (“[N]ow, that party might put in a defence shewing, for in-
stance, . . . that he has some special ground why his particular lands are exempt from the right in 
question.”); Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 25 Eng. Rep. 946, 947 (Ch. 1737) 
(“[N]othwithstanding the general right is tried and established, the defendants take advantage 
of their several exemptions, for distinct rights.”). 
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The [Ontario] Act makes a clear distinction between the role of a 
party and that of a class member.  Section 14 gives the court a 
broad discretion to permit class members to participate in a pro-
ceeding and to provide for the manner in which the participation is 
permitted.  Not surprisingly, [Section] 14 does not provide that class 
members who are permitted to participate thereby become parties 
to the proceeding.  The section does not restrict participation to 
those class members who are able to fairly and adequately repre-
sent the class.  Indeed, the court may permit participation by those 
who oppose the manner in which the party representing the class is 
conducting the proceeding and who assert positions that differ from 
those of the majority of the class.193 
Furthermore, following the conclusion of the class proceeding, class 
members may seek to have an adverse judgment delivered at the con-
clusion of the class suit, set aside or reversed on appeal, by challeng-
ing the adequacy of the representation of the class members’ inter-
ests.194  As was pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1961 
defendant class suit: “the judgment in a class action will bind only 
those members of the class whose interests have been adequately rep-
resented by existing parties to the litigation . . . .”195 
The U.S. case law on defendant class actions also evinces a judi-
cial willingness to introduce whatever measures are believed neces-
sary to protect the rights of defendant class members.196  In Appleton 
Electric Company v. Advance-United Expressways, for instance, the 
 
 193. Dabbs v. Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada, [1998] 41 O.R.3d 97, 100.  See also Chippe-
was of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 29 O.R.3d 549, 569–70. 
 194. See, e.g., Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1106; Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Kerney, 624 F.2d at 721.  See also Gross, supra note 5, at 644; WILLIAMS, supra note 125, at 290; 
Wolfson, supra note 5, at 492; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 415–16; Note, Collateral At-
tack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV. 589, 594–601 (1974). 
With respect to representative proceedings, see Commissioners of Sewers, (1876) 3 Ch. D. 610, 
617 (Jessel, MR): “[N]ow, that party might put in a defense shewing, for instance, that the 
originial decree was fraudulently obtained.” 
 195. Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961).  See also Marcera v. 
Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1240 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979); Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 
85 F.R.D. 701, 705 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Mgmt. Television Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 52 
F.R.D. 162, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1971).  This scenario, of course, provides plaintiffs with a strong incen-
tive to nominate adequate representative defendants.  See ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, ¶ 442 
n.377; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 479.  With respect to representative proceedings, see Taff Vale 
Ry. Co. v. Amal. Soc’y of Ry. Servants, A.C. 426, 438 (1901) (“[A] trade union . . . may be sued 
in a representative action if the persons so selected as defendants be persons who . . . may be 
taken fairly to represent the body.”). 
 196. “Steps may be taken during the course of these proceedings to insure that the rights of 
class members are protected . . . .”  Mgmt. Television, 52 F.R.D. at 165.  See also Follette v. Vi-
tanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio 
1972) (“The safeguards in Rule 23 are certainly adequate to protect the interests of absent par-
ties . . . .”). 
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court appointed independent counsel to represent the defendant class 
other than the seventeen named defendants.197 
In determining whether the proposed representative defendant 
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, most 
U.S. and Ontario courts have recognized that the unwillingness of 
such defendants to represent the class may not be regarded as a rele-
vant factor.198  Otherwise, the defendant class proceeding device 
would hardly, if ever, be employed.199  Furthermore, several courts 
have noted “the irony that an unwilling defendant who vigorously 
opposes his representative capacity may in fact prove to be the most 
effective advocate of the class.”200  Instead, courts have focused on the 
need to ensure that the following factors are present:201 (a) representa-
 
 197. Appleton Elec., 494 F.2d at 132.  See also Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D. at 694 (“One 
form of protection the court has employed has been to invite absent members of the class to ap-
pear personally before the court whenever they think it necessary or advisable to do so.  Absen-
tees have accepted the invitation by filing briefs with the court on numerous occasions.”); Dale 
Electronics., Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D.N.H. 1971) (“I am . . . going 
to order that any defendant who requests it shall be furnished, at the plaintiff’s expense, a copy 
of any deposition and/or interrogatory.”). 
 198. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 
1995); Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1239; Doe v. Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 466 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Luyando 
v. Bowen, 124 F.R.D. 52, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., No. 82–
0983–CV–W–5, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22022, at *25 (W.D. Miss. Nov. 14, 1984); Thillens, 97 
F.R.D. at 679; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 22 B.R. 
1005, 1009 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 117–18 (N.D. Ga. 1981); 
Ragsdale, 625 F. Supp. at 1223; Cont’l Ill. Nat. Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80 C 2642, 1980 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D. at 694 
n.9; Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398, 407 n.13 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Research Corp. v. 
Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. 
C.J. LEXIS 499, at *23–24 (per Cumming, J.); Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 29 
O.R.3d 549, 568–69.  See also VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 380; Wolfson, supra note 5, 
482–83.  But see Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 913–14 (9th Cir. 1981); Nat’l Ass’n for Mental 
Health, Inc. v. Califano, 717 F.2d 1451, 1458 (D.D.C. 1983); Canadian St. Regis Band, 97 F.R.D. 
at 458; Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 529–30 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Gross, supra note 5, at 622–23, 
645–46; Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a Defendant Class: A Pro-
posed Revision of Rule 23, 1990 BYU L. REV. 909, 921; Bailey, supra note 121, at 483.  The will-
ingness of representative defendants to take such a role has also been regarded as an irrelevant 
consideration in representative proceedings.  See, e.g., Nat’l Supply, 3 W.W.R. at 712. 
 199. See Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1239 (“But courts must not readily accede to the wishes of 
named defendants in this area, for to permit them to abdicate so easily would utterly vitiate the 
effectiveness of the defendant class action as an instrument for correcting widespread illegal-
ity.”).  See also Monaco, 187 F.R.D. at 65; Doss, 93 F.R.D. at 117–18; VALPARAISO Note, supra 
note 5, at 381; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 639. 
 200. In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 844.  See also Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 679; Marcera, 91 F.R.D. 
at 584; In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Broadhollow, 66 
B.R. at 1011;. 
 201. In the context of a plaintiff representative proceeding, the Supreme Court of Canada 
indicated that 
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tion by qualified, experienced and competent counsel;202 (b) the lack 
of conflicting or antagonistic interests between the representatives 
and the class members;203 (c) the absence of collusion between the 
plaintiffs and the named defendants;204 and (d) the existence of named 
defendants who have both sufficient resources to properly defend the 
action and claims substantial enough to warrant defending.205 
In the few occasions that defendant classes have been certified 
under the Ontario Act, courts have ensured that adequate notice was 
provided to the class members.206  Similarly, many U.S. courts have 
ordered that notice be provided to members of defendant classes cer-
tified under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2)207 even though in pro-
 
in assessing whether the proposed representative is adequate, the court may look to 
the motivation of the representative, the competence of the representative’s counsel, 
and the capacity of the representative to bear any costs that may be incurred by the 
representative in particular (as opposed to by counsel or by the class members gener-
ally).  The proposed representative need not be ‘typical’ of the class, nor the ‘best’ pos-
sible representative. The court should be satisfied, however, that the proposed repre-
sentative will vigorously and capably prosecute the interests of the class. 
Western Canadian, [2001] 201 D.L.R.(4th) at 385, 402 (McLachlin, C.J.). 
 202. See, e.g., Webcraft, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 185; In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee 
Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 113; Oneida Indian Nation of 
Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701, 705 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). For a rare example of a judicial finding 
that the proposed representative defendant’s “counsel is not capable of representing the defen-
dant class,” see De Allaume v. Perales, 110 F.R.D. 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 203. See Oneida, 85 F.R.D. at 706 (“The possibility of antagonistic interests prevents certifi-
cation of a class only if the antagonism goes to the subject matter of the litigation . . . .”).  See 
also Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, 214 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Kan. 2003); Alexander 
Grant, 116 F.R.D. at 589; Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 680; Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, 
[1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) 574, 575.  With respect to representative proceedings, see Hardie & 
Lane, Ltd. v. Chiltren, 1 K.B. 663, 700 (1928) (“[I]f the personal interests of the defendants con-
flict with the interests of the persons on whose behalf they are sued, they are obviously not the 
proper parties to represent such persons.”). 
 204. See, e.g., In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 844; In re Broadhollow, 66 B.R. at 1011. 
 205. See Alexander Grant, 116 F.R.D. at 583; In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 844; In re Broadhol-
low, 66 B.R. at 1011; In re Consumers, 105 F.R.D. at 613; Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 679; In re Gap 
Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 303; Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80 C 2642, 1980 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Chippewas, [1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) at 575 
(Adams, J.); Holo, supra note 4, at 234; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 485; Max, supra note 5, at 455 
n.14. 
 206. See Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *30 (Cumming, J.); Chippewas, 29 
O.R.3d at 572.  In Chippewas, the court ordered the plaintiff to “assume the costs of giving no-
tice.”  Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 572.  It is also vital to note that Section 19(1) of the Ontario Act 
and Rule 299.37(1) of the FC Rules empower the courts to order, at any time, any party to give 
such notice as they consider necessary to protect the interests of any class member or party or to 
ensure the fair conduct of the proceeding. 
 207. See, e.g., Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at 659; Webcraft, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 186; 
Canadian St. Regis Band, 97 F.R.D. at 459; In re Braniff, 22 B.R. at 1009; Marcera, 91 F.R.D. at 
585; Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D. 64, 69 (D. Wis. 1981); In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 127; 
Oneida 85 F.R.D. at 707; Lynch Corp. v. MII Liquidating Co., 82 F.R.D. 478, 483 (D.S.D. 1979); 
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ceedings certified under these rules notice is not mandatory.208  On 
some occasions, plaintiffs have been ordered to provide,209 and/or 
meet the cost of, such notice.210 
Another important measure for protecting the interests of de-
fendant class members is provided by the mechanisms governing the 
settlement or discontinuance of class actions.211  Such settlements or 
discontinuances need to be approved by the court.212  An integral part 
of these mechanisms is that class members must be given an opportu-
nity to convince the court that the proposed settlement would not be 
fair, adequate or reasonable.213  If the named defendants enter into a 
 
Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1068 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Trucking Employers 75 F.R.D. at 
685; Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 418; Truckee–Carson, 71 F.R.D. at 18; Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 
14, 18 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287, 289 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Dale 
Electronics, Inc. v. RCL Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 533 (D.N.H. 1971).  See also Gross, 
supra note 5, at 626–51; Ancheta, supra note 5, 301–02; Ball, supra note 10, at 619; Parsons & 
Starr, supra note 5, at 895; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 416–19.  But see Weinman, 262 
F.3d at 1110; Baksalary v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 1279, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Institutionalized Ju-
veniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 78 F.R.D. 413, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lynch v. Household Fi-
nance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 (D. Conn. 1973); Penn. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Penn-
sylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1972); N. Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 
619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968); HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 646 (“[N]otice should only be re-
quired when, and to the extent that, it is needed to ensure [effective] representation [of the de-
fendant’s interest].”). 
 208. See supra note 114. 
 209. See, e.g., In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 127 (“the Court will order plaintiffs to send notice of 
the action to all members of the underwriter classes and therefore avoid any due process prob-
lems due to lack of notice.”) (emphasis added).  See also Holo, supra note 4, at 267; MICHIGAN 
Note, supra note 161, at 362–63. 
 210. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 72 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1096, 
1098 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1996) (“Because it is the plaintiffs that seek to maintain this suit as a 
class action, and because the cost of notice should be de minimis, the cost will be borne by the 
plaintiffs.”); Lynch Corp., 82 F.R.D. at 483 (“It does not seem fair to make the defendants pay 
for a class certification they oppose, when on the merits of the case they might have no liabil-
ity.”).  See also Gross, supra note 5, at 660; Ball, supra note 10, at 619; Note, Binding Effect of 
Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1954). 
 211. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); Ontario Act § 29; FC Rules, Rules 299.31 and 299.32. 
 212. See Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059, 1060 (7th Cir. 1970); Tilley v. 
TJX Cos., 212 F.R.D. 43, 49 (D. Mass 2003); Monument Builders of Pa., Inc. v. Am. Cemetery 
Ass’n, 206 F.R.D. 113, 121 (2002); Endo v. Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 172 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Alva-
rado Ptnrs., 130 F.R.D. at 676; Pa. Ass’n, 343 F. Supp. at 289; Dale, 53 F.R.D. at 536 (“Rule 
23(e) . . . fully insures that no settlement will be binding without an opportunity for all of the 
defendants to be heard in opposition.  I can assure the defendants that the issue of liability will 
not be held binding on any members of the class by way of dismissal or compromise if there is 
an objection.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Class members must 
be given an opportunity to convince the court that the settlement proposed would not be fair, 
adequate, or reasonable.”); Brimner v. Via Rail Canada, Inc., [2000] 50 O.R.3d 114, 122 (Brock-
enshire, J.) (“The practice has developed of giving notice of an intended settlement and hearing 
representations by objectors and intervenors before granting approval.”); Note, Leading Cases: 
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settlement agreement unfavorable214 to the class members or refuse to 
enter into an advantageous agreement, “the court retains numerous 
powers to protect the interests of the class, the least of which is decer-
tification.”215 
Attention can now be turned to the third argument set out 
above, concerning the potential unfairness of defendant class actions, 
namely, that defendant class members may be asked to pay damages 
whilst someone else, the named defendant, has the carriage of the de-
fense.  This argument is largely inaccurate.216  Conte and Newberg 
have addressed the issue thus: 
In most cases that seek to recover monetary relief against members 
of a defendant class, the determination of the amount of monetary 
relief against each class member will raise some individual issues 
that cannot be resolved on a common basis in a class proceeding.  
In addition, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to pre-
sent unique defenses.  Thus, independent proceedings will be re-
quired to establish the amount of monetary relief to which the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover against any particular defendant class 
member.  A specific monetary judgment against individual defen-
dant class members is not available on a class action basis, except to 
the limited extent of developing a common formula or guideline 
that will serve as the measure of damages in proceedings against 
individual class members.217 
This state of affairs is expressly recognized by Rule 3.501(I)(1) of the 
Michigan Court Rules which provides that “an action that seeks to 
recover money from individual members of a defendant class may not 
be maintained as a class action.” 
 
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 116 HARV. L. REV. 332, 340 (2002) (“all class members have 
the right to challenge a proposed class settlement at a fairness hearing and are assured notice of 
the proposed settlement and an opportunity to be heard.  Objectors have the right to introduce 
evidence to create a record.  At fairness hearings, class members may also challenge the ade-
quacy of representation when objecting to the fairness of the proposed settlement.”). 
 214. In In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 838, the court denied approval of a settlement proposed 
by some of the representative defendants. 
 215. In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 304 (N.D. Cal. 1978).  See also In re Activi-
sion Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
 216. See Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 387 (7th Cir. 1996); Canadian St. 
Regis Band, 97 F.R.D. at 457; Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 90 F.R.D. 589, 594–95 (E.D. Pa. 
1981); In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 293; Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio 1972); 
Dale, 53 F.R.D. at 535–36.  See also Gross, supra note 5, at 634, 643, 652; Wolfson, supra note 5, 
at 466; Max, supra note 5, at 468–69; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 637; Ball, supra note 10, 
at 619–20. 
 217. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 349.  With respect to representative proceedings, 
see e.g., National Supply, 3 W.W.R. at 714 (“[B]ut it should be understood that there shall be no 
personal judgment for payment of money against the holders of royalty certificates other than 
the named defendants in respect of such claims.”).  See also 1922 Note, supra note 5, at 91. 
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In light of the analysis developed in this Part, it is not surprising 
that there have been very few reported instances of inadequate repre-
sentation of defendant classes in the United States.218  This scenario is 
vividly illustrated by the fact that in the United States the only actual 
illustration of the unfairness that can result from defendant class ac-
tions, which has generally been provided by those who regard defen-
dant classes as potentially unfair, is a 1945 defendant class action in 
Texas.219  It is difficult to see why the United State’s positive experi-
ence—when considered in its totality—with defendant class actions 
should not similarly be enjoyed in Canada, especially when one con-
siders that, as a result of Section 12 of the Ontario Act,220 Ontario 
courts may make any order they consider appropriate respecting the 
conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious de-
termination.221 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that members of defendant classes should not 
be allowed to opt out of defendant representative proceedings and 
defendant class actions as that right is inconsistent with the policy ob-
jectives of these proceedings and is not necessary in order to protect 
the interests of class members.  It is therefore submitted that the rules 
governing representative proceedings and the Ontario Act and the 
 
 218. See Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 219. See generally Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex. 497 (1945).  In Richardson, “defendant class 
members attacked an adverse judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had purposely chosen as 
class representatives members whose personal liability was small in relation to that of the other 
defendants; consequently, the named defendants offered little if any opposition to the plaintiff’s 
claims.  Moreover, the class members asserted that the plaintiff had excluded from the named 
defendants certain members purporting to have contract provisions specially limiting their li-
ability.” Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 108 F.R.D. 107, 112 n.5 (C.D. Ill. 1985).  See also 
Ancheta, supra note 5, at 300 n.79; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 640; VALPARAISO Note, 
supra note 5, at 382 n.93; Wright, supra note 171, at 173 n.24; Lee, supra note 5, at 60 n.63; Bai-
ley, supra note 121, at 483; Van Dercreek, supra note 178, at 278 n.26; Kruger & Rogers, supra 
note 11, at 858 n.111; Note, Due Process Requirements of a State Class Action, 55 YALE L. J. 831 
(1946) (analyzing Richardson v. Kelly); CHAFEE, supra note 171, at 234–42. 
 220. A similar provision does not appear in the FC Rules, as a result of the FC Committee’s 
conclusion that “in the era of case management, such provisions are unnecessary.  Instead, class 
proceedings should be treated as ‘specially managed proceedings’ under Rule 385.”  FC Com-
mittee, supra note 5, at 66.  As a result, Rule 384.1 provides that “an action commenced by a 
member of a class of persons on behalf of the members of that class shall be conducted as a spe-
cially managed proceeding.” 
 221. See OLRC REPORT, supra note 5.  See also Morabito, supra note 14, at 673; SLC RE-
PORT, supra note 34, at ¶ 4.85; MLRC REPORT, supra note 69, at 88. 
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FC Rules should be amended in order to remove from defendant 
class members the ability to opt out. 
In the absence of the amendments proposed above, courts pre-
siding over defendant representative proceedings should return to the 
traditional approach of not allowing represented persons to opt out 
but permitting them, instead, to apply to the court to be appointed as 
named defendants.  An alternative approach, which is arguably con-
sistent with the current provisions of the Ontario Act and the FC 
Rules governing opt out rights, is provided by the regime imple-
mented in 1988 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois in Williams v. State Board of Elections.222  In Williams the 
court provided members of defendant classes certified under Rule 
23(b)(3) with the following three options: 
(A) To do nothing, in which case they will remain members of the 
defendant class to which they have been assigned; (B) To opt out of 
the class and be joined as individual party defendants; (C) To opt 
out of the class, but stipulate that they will agree to be bound by the 
outcome of the litigation, in which case we will excuse them from 
all further proceedings.  This third option would seem to be the op-
tion of choice for members of the defendant class who do not op-
pose the plaintiffs’ position on the merits.223 
The court explained as follows the rationale for this regime: 
Although a procedure by which opt-out defendants remain in a 
lawsuit may appear unorthodox, it is actually no different from 
what would occur if these necessary party defendants had all been 
joined individually.  They would be free to retain counsel in groups 
if they chose, but their decision to be represented singly or in 
groups would not alter the fact that they were defendants in the 
case.224 
 
 
 222. 696 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
 223. Id. at 1578. 
 224. Id. 
